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THE USES AND ABUSES OF CONVICTIONS
SET ASIDE UNDER THE FEDERAL
YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT
FRED C. ZACHARIAS*
In 1950 Congress enacted a comprehensive alternative sentencing
system for youthful offenders between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
six.' As part of this Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA)2 Congress
provided that convicted youthful offenders3 who satisfy the require-
ments of their sentences may have their convictions "set aside."'4 Much
has been written about the technical meaning of that provision,5 but
little attention has been paid to its practical effect.6 This article seeks to
fill that void.
Confusion arises initially from the language the 1950 Congress
chose to insert into the statute.7 What does "set aside" mean? Is it
equivalent to "expungement?" Is it the same as sealing the records for
all purposes, or for some purposes? Is it intended instead to parallel a
presidential pardon, or some lesser form of executive grace? The
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1. Federal Youth Corrections Act, ch. 1115, 64 Stat. 1085 (1950).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
3. The Act applies to offenders convicted under federal or District of Columbia law. 18
U.S.C. § 5024 (1976).
4. Id § 5021.
5. See, ag., Harnsberger, Does the Federal Youth CorrectionsAct Remove the 'Leper'r Bell"
from Rehabilitated Offenders?, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 395 (1979); Ritz, Federal Youth Corrections
Act: The Continuing Charade, 13 U. RiCH. L. Rnv. 743 (1979); Saperstein, Expungementfor Youth
Offenders, 83 CAsE & CoM. 3 (1978); Schaefer, The Use of Expunged Convictions in Federal
Courts, 35 FED. B.J. 107 (1976); Note, Expungement of Criminal Records Under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 547 (1976).
6. But see Schaefer, The Federal Youth Corrections-4ct: The Purposes and Uses of Vacating
the Conviction, 39 FED. PROBATION 31, 31 (Sept. 1975), in which the author notes, without further
analysis, the existing uncertainty about how and when a set-aside conviction may be used.
7. Section 5021, as amended in minor detail in 1976, provides:
(a) Upon the unconditional discharge by the Commission of a committed youth
offender before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed upon him, the convic-
tion shall be automatically set aside and the Commission shall issue to the youth of-
fender a certificate to that effect.
(b) Where a youth offender has been placed on probation by the court, the court
may thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally discharge such youth offender from pro-
bation prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by
the court, which discharge shall automatically set aside the conviction, and the court
shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.
18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1976).
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meaning of the words should, of course, determine what effect a set-
aside conviction is to be given in any situation. Yet the legislative his-
tory and judicial interpretation of the words obfuscate rather than clar-
ify.8 Part I of this article briefly examines the legislative history of
section 5021 of the FYCA and the judicial opinions that have inter-
preted it, and draws conclusions about the intended meaning of the
words "set aside." Only by understanding what Congress wanted to
accomplish by, setting aside convictions of youthful offenders can
judges and law enforcement officials determine when and how those
convictions should be used after the setting-aside process is complete.9
8. American jurisdictions have used many different words to refer to reducing the effect of a
prior conviction. Some of these words, such as "expungement," are well-defined. See, e.g.,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (5th ed. 1979). ("Expungement ofrecord Process by which record
of criminal conviction is destroyed or sealed after expiration of time"). In this article, the term
"expunged" means "rendered null and unusuable for any purpose." Other terms, such as "seal-
ing" or "erasure" of records are defined, but may encompass a range of procedures or concepts.
See, ag., BLACK'S LAW DiCTiONARY, supra, at 486 ("Erasure of record ... Within statute pro-
viding that all police and court records shall be erased upon acquittal of the accused, word 'erased'
means at the very least nondisclosure") (emphasis added). Compare Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d
1226, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1979), with District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d 175, 181 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1979). In these cases the federal and local appellate courts within the same jurisdiction
established entirely different procedures based on varying interpretations of the words'"expunge.
ment" and "sealing." A third set of words, such as "set aside" and "vacate," are used synony-
mously but have no defined meaning whatsoever. See Schaefer, supra note 5, at 108. For a
comparison of the definitions of the various terms employed to limit the effect of criminal convic-
tions, see Kogon & Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 61 J.
CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 378, 379-80 (1970).
The linguistic confusion is exacerbated by judicial and legislative imprecision in referring to
those procedures that are well-defined. Courts interpreting statutes with ill-defined terms such as
"set aside" routinely refer to them as "expunction" statutes. See, eg., Rebman v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 544 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1976); Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854, 856 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1962). Some state statutes use defined concepts like expungement to mean something
less than destruction or sealing. See, ag., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4(a) (West Supp.
1981). See Note, The Effect ofExpungement on a Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL. L. Rav. 127, 132
(1967); cf. United States v. Glasgow, 389 F. Supp. 217, 225 n.21 (D.D.C. 1975) (referring to 36
state expungement statutes, some of which provide for probation even before any conviction is
registered).
A full examination of statutes other than the FYCA is beyond the scope of this article. For
discussions of other statutes or provisions for reducing the force of criminal convictions, see
Baum, H4ping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Rebord, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 816 (1965); Booth, The Ex-
pungement Myth, 38 L.A.B. BULL. 161 (1963); Gough, The Expungement ofAdjudication Records
of Juvenile andAdult Offenders: A Problem of Statas, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147 (1966); Schaefer,
supra note 5, at 107; Comment, Criminal Records ofArrest and Conviction: Expungementfrom the
General Public Access, 3 CAL. W.L. Rav. 121 (1967); Note, 40 S. CAL. L. RaV., supra, at 127.
9. Not all young offenders are entitled to the benefits of the FYCA. The first step toward
obtaining a set-aside conviction is for the young offender to be sentenced under the FYCA to a
term of probation, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976), or to a term of incarceration followed by a term of
parole, id § 5010(b), (c). Before imposing such a sentence the court must determine whether the
defendant would benefit from treatment under the FYCA. Id § 5010. See Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974), and cases cited therein. For discussions of the process of making a
finding of benefit, see Note, Sentencing Under the Federal Youth CorrectionsAct: The Needfor an
VoL 1981:477] USES/ABUSES OF CONVICTIONS
Part II of this article identifies the situations in which a set-aside
conviction may assume significance. Some of these situations arise in
the trial context, others do not. The common theme among them is
that the former defendant would prefer the set-aside conviction to be
ignored. Part II then discusses whether courts should permit the con-
victions to be used. This discussion, although focusing on specific situ-
ations, provides a framework of analysis generally applicable to other
circumstances that may arise. The guidelines that emerge should assist
future courts in determining when it is appropriate to allow set-aside
convictions to resurface to the detriment of FYCA offenders,10 despite
the prior judicial promise to them of a second chance in life. 1
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The FYC4 Generally.
The correctional system embodied in.the FYCA is based on the
English Borstal system of corrections. 12 The Borstal system came into
Explicit Finding and a Statement of Reasons, 53 B.U.L. REv. 1071 (1973); Note, Sentencing Under
the Federal Youth Corrections Act: The Interpretive Conflict Concerning Judicial Discretion, 23
CATH. U.L. REV. 574 (1974); Note, Appellate Review of Federal Youth Corrections Act Sentences in
the Aftermath of Dorszynski v. United States, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 110 (1976); Note, An Ap-
proach to "No Benft" Findings Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1173
(1977); Comment, Sentencing Under Section 5010(D) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 1974
WASH. U.L.Q. 741.
After the defendant has served a portion of his probation successfully but before it is com-
pleted, he or his probation officer may request the court to terminate the probation before the
expiration of the maximum term. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) (1976). A parolee may make the same
request of the Parole Commission. Id § 5021(b). If this request is honored, the court or Parole
Commission "discharges" the defendant from further service of his sentence, and issues a "certifi-
cate of discharge" to that effect. Discharge serves to set aside the conviction automatically. id
§ 5021(a), (b).
As a practical matter, discharge is customarily initiated by a parole or probation officer
shortly before the expiration of the sentence of any offender who has not been rearrested during
the period of his probation or parole and who has complied in reasonable fashion with the condi-
tions of his release. Once the probation or parole officer requests discharge, it is routinely granted.
See United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11, 13 n.3 (6th Cir. 1976) (failure to accord FYCA benefits
was a "clerical error"); United States v. McCord, Civ. No. M-1487-71 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Jan. 16,
1980) (conviction set aside nuncpro tunc after expiration of sentence because the failure to set
aside earlier was a ministerial error); cf Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854, 855-56 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (a defendant with good conduct must be discharged and given the benefits of the FYCA).
10. The term "FYCA offender" denotes an offender whose conviction has been set aside
under the FYCA.
11. See, eg., United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d 1279, 1280 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Fryer, 545 F.2d 11, 14 (6th Cir. 1976); Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462
F.2d 1030, 1032 (Ist Cir. 1972); United States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
United States v. Glasgow, 389 F. Supp. 217, 224 (D.D.C. 1975).
12. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERv.
3983, 3987. See also Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432 (1974); United States v. Fryer,
402 F. Supp. 831, 837 (N.D. Ohio 1975), al7'd, 545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1976).
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being at the turn of the century in response to a report on the adminis-
tration of British prisons. 13 The report revealed that a disproportionate
number of youths aged sixteen to twenty-one passed through prison
and were released unrehabilitated. A correctional system emphasizing
retraining and follow-up services for offenders of those ages was devel-
oped and proved successful.' 4
The English precedent led Congress and the various legislative
and judicial committees reporting to it to examine American crime sta-
tistics.' 5 The parallels were striking. American youths aged sixteen to
twenty-three accounted for a highly disproportionate share of crime
16
and, once having passed through the regular adult correctional system,
were found to be more likely to commit other criminal acts.' 7 Congress
resolved to establish the FYCA along the lines of the Borstal system in
order to solve these problems.' 8
In enacting the FYCA, and particularly section 5021, Congress re-
lied on three conclusions about young offenders. Congress believed
that youths were overrepresented in the criminal population, and that
Many commentators have examined the legislative history of the FYCA at length. See, e.g.,
Harnsberger, supra note 5, at 402-09; Saperstein, supra note 5, at 4; Schaefer, supra note 6, at 31-
32; Note, supra note 5, at 557-63. It is not this article's purpose to duplicate or expand upon those
examinations. The legislative history is discussed here only insofar as is necessary to understand
the congressional intent underlying the provision for setting aside convictions.
13. This report is described in H.R. Ran. No. 2979, supra note 12, at 4-7, reprinted in [1950]
U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 3983, 3987-89.
14. Id 5-6, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SEav. 3983, 3988.
15. Congress first expressed an interest in enacting a youth correctional system in the early
1940s. In 1941 a committee of distinguished judges met to study the question, and in 1942 the
group produced a comprehensive report recommending a system much like the FYCA. See Com-
mittee on Punishment for Crime of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, Draft ofan
Act Recommended by the Committee to Provide a Correctional System for Adult and Youth Offen-
ders Convicted in Courts of the United States (1942), in COMMrrrE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME 14-20 (1942). The report was transmitted to the House of
Representatives the following year. Federal Corrections Act and Improvement in Parole Hearings
on H. 2139 and H.? 2140 Before Subcomm No. 3 of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5-6 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 2140]. After a three-year lull, a new
but essentially identical draft of legislation was proposed in REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES 18-19 (1946). Finally, in 1949, the Senate held hearings featur-
ing the judicial committee members. See Correctional Systemfor Youth Offenders: Hearings on S.
1114 and S. 2609 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm on the Judiclary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1114 and. 2609]. One year later, Congress enacted the
FYCA.
16. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 12, at 2, reprintedn [1950] U.S. CODE CONE. Smv.
3983, 3984 (citing [1949] FBI SEmIANNUAL CRIME REPORT).
17. H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 12, at 2, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 3983,
3985.
18. Id
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the overrepresentation, as in England, could not be a coincidence. 19 It
therefore examined reports of contemporary social scientists, and con-
cluded that youthful offenders are markedly different in nature and
character from adult offenders; Congress accepted the findings of the
reports that youths undergoing the transition from adolescence to man-
hood are psychologically more susceptible to antisocial conduct, but
that the tendency is a temporary one. These reports reinforced Con-
gress's views of the character of young offenders. 20 Carrying the con-
cept to its logical end, Congress determined that dealing with young
offenders at an early stage was the only way to turn them from a life of
habitual crime; offenders within the relevant age group were seen to be
at a crossroads, with one fork leading to rehabilitation, the other to
indefinite recidivism.21
Dovetailing with its determination that youthful offenders are dis-
tinctive in nature and character was Congress's second conclusion: that
youths in the eighteen to twenty-six year age group22 are easier to reha-
bilitate than adults, but that this rehabilitation can be accomplished
only by providing unique sentencing -procedures and correctional facil-
ities for them. Congress estimated that seventy percent of all youthful
offenders could be "rehabilitated and made useful members of soci-
19. Id, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3984. Enactment of the FYCA has not
reduced this overrepresentation. See, eg., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1976 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 181 (This report reveals that in 1976 persons 21
years of age and younger accounted for approximately 45% of all offenses charged). In 1950,
when the FYCA was passed, crime statistics indicated that this age group was responsible for only
20% of the crimes charged. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
FOR THE U.S. AND ITS POSSESSIONS 110-11 (1950). See also United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779,
782 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("current statistics continue to show this disproportionality"). No statis-
tics are available, however, regarding the current level of recidivism among defendants sentenced
under the FYCA.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 12, at 2, reprintedih [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
3983, 3984. "Sociologists and psychiatrists tell us that special causations which occurin the period
between adolescence and manhood are, in a large measure, responsible for antisocial conduct
trends manifested by persons in that age group." See also United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779,
781 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Fryer, 402 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ohio 1975), afl'd, 565 F.2d 11
(6th Cir. 1976). The process by which Congress arrived at these conclusions is described in Harns-
berger, supra note 5, at 402-05; Note, supra note 5, at 559-63. Although the conclusions may be
correct, Congress appears to have relied on the expertise of the senior judges who formed the
committees reporting on youth corrections rather than to have sought testimony directly from the
psychologists and social scientists. See note 15 supra.
21. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432-34 (1974); Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d
1226, 1233-43 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779, 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
22. Although the British statistics were drawn from the 16 to 21 year age group, see text
following note 13 supra, and the American from the 16 to 23 year age group, see text accompany-
ing note 16 supra, Congress chose to accord special treatment to the 18 to 26 year age group.
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ety."23 Although the basis for this estimate does not appear in the re-
cord of the legislative proceedings, research substantiates that first
offenders--who are likely to be youths24-are the least likely to commit
additional crimes.25 Congress believed that in view of these facts it
would be dangerous to incarcerate or threaten to incarcerate youths in
adult facilities, where hardened criminals would be able to influence
them and thus reduce the likelihood of their rehabilitation.26
23. H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 12, at 10, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
3983, 3993. As the Supreme Court stated in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974):
"The panoply of treatment options available under the Act is but further evidence that the YCA
program was intended to be sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all but the 'incorrigible'
youth." Id at 449 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391, 392 (6th Cir.
1977) ("The purpose of the Youth Corrections Act is to enhance the probability of rehabilitation
of youthful offenders"); United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11, 13 (6th Cir. 1976) ("The Youth Cor-
rections Act is a statute aimed at the rehabilitation of young offenders").
24. Indeed, some proponents of the legislation as well as some courts interpreting it appar-
ently assumed that the Act was directed exclusively at first offenders. In a letter to Senator Kil-
gore, Judge Charles C. Wyche (W.D.S.C.), one of the bill's supporters, wrote: "I believe that a
boy who makes one mistake should be permanently forgiven that mistake if his subsequent con-
duct indicates that he has changed his behavior." Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609, supra note 15,
at 117. See Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462 F.2d 1030, 1032 (1st Cir.
1972); United States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Nothing in the FYCA,
however, limits its application to first offenders. In the author's experience, courts frequently sen-
tence persons with juvenile or minor adult records to probation or incarceration under the FYCA.
25. In A. NussBAuM, A SECOND CHANCE, AMNESTY FOR THE FIRST OFFENDER 29 (1974),
the author estimates that 4.5 million persons are arrested each year and that 1.8 million of those
persons are nonrecidivists. These estimates--even granting the possibility of a substantial statisti-
cal variance-indicate that first offenders have a high potential for rehabilitation, with or without
the benefits of the FYCA. Nussbaum suggests that the true recidivism rate for first offenders is
somewhere between 20-25%. Id 82. See also Frym, The Treatment of Recidivisis, 47 J. CRim.
L.C. & P.S. 1, 2 (1956) (arguing that incarceration is counter-productive to rehabilitation); Gough,
supra note 8, at 159-62.
26. Congress's belief no doubt stemmed in part from a submission to Emanuel Celler, the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, in which the Deputy Attorney General espoused
the separate correctional scheme partly because of the characteristics of young offenders and
partly because of a felt need to separate them from older offenders:
The Director [of the Bureau of Prisons] has stated that many of those youths 22 and 23
years of age who are convicted in Federal courts are in trouble for the first time, and
experience has indicated that they would be responsive to the flexible procedures pro-
vided by this measure. Also, during recent times the Bureau of Prisons has found that
over 40 percent of the persons under 24 years of age presently being committed to itsjurisdiction are veterans. This group, whose industrial and vocational training has been
retarded because of military service, has special need for the program contemplated by
the measure.
Another 6onsideration urged by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is that com-
mitments in several of the previously established reformatories have been limited to per-
sons up to 24 years of age. Such offenders are, generally speaking, too young to be
committed to the ordinary penitentiaries and are the offenders who justify special efforts
at rehabilitation.
It is interesting to note that the Borstal system in Great Britain, on which the pro-
posed procedure is based to a considerable extent, originally set the age limit at 21 but
that after a period of trial the age limit was raised to 23. Experience ifidicated the need
to bring within the scope of the system a large number of youthful offenders who other-
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With this background in mind, Congress reached its third and per-
haps most controversial 27 conclusion: that the purposes of the FYCA
would best be served by setting aside convictions once youthful offend-
ers completed a program of rehabilitation. 28 This conclusion was based
on two separate and partially inconsistent premises. First, Congress as-
sumed that it would be appropriate to offer a reward for successful re-
habilitation;29 if the youth proved himself to be "good" by following
the prescribed rules, the effect of his conviction and punishment would
be minimized. Second, and perhaps more significant, Congress thought
that setting aside convictions itself would help offenders to be rehabili-
wise might become repeaters through association with older and more experienced of-
fenders.
H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 12, at 9, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3992-
93; see Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609, supra note 15, at 9 (testimony of Hon. Bolitha J. Laws
(D.D.C.)). See also Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 434 (1974).
In United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that no circumstances exist in which FYCA offenders can properly be
incarcerated with adult offenders. This holding contradicted the conclusions of several other
courts, see Abernathy v. United States, 418 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969); Barr v. United States, 415 F.
Supp. 990 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Foote v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 627 (D. Nev. 1969); Coats v.
Markley, 200 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Ind. 1962), but is consistent with the purposes underlying the
FYCA. Dancy is discussed in Comment, Youth Offender Sentenced Under Federal Youth Correc-
tions Xct May Not Be Conjnedin the General Population of the Federal Penitentiary, 10 RuT.-CAM.
LJ. 471 (1979).
27. Controversy surfaced when Senator Kilgore solicited opinions from federal district court
judges about the proposed legislation. Most judges reacted favorably. Judge John Paul of the
Eastern District of Virginia, however, strongly objected to the set-aside provision, stating:
For one thing, it would restore to some vicious and dangerous persons the full rights of
citizenship, involving the right to vote and to serve on juries, etc. It would also involve
the question of... this synthetic pardon in case of future offenses.. . . I am, of course,
sympathetic with any effort to rehabilitate persons convicted of crime and to restore
them to a life of good conduct, but it is my firm impression that much of the criminality
of today is encouraged by the lenient treatment accorded to criminals.
Hearings on . 1114 andS. 2609, supra note 15, at 110. See also Harnsberger, supra note 5, at 404-
10; Note, supra note 5, at 549.
28. Some commentators apparently assume that because Congress believed some provisions
minimizing the effect of a young offender's conviction would be rehabilitative or otherwise benefi-
cial, Congress must have intended the convictions to be expunged in their entirety. See, e.g.,
Harnsberger, supra note 5, at 402-09; Saperstein, supra note 5, at 4; Schaefer, supra note 6, at 31-
32. As discussed below, Congress may well have intended some lesser form of relief. See text
accompanying notes 40-42 infra. At least three courts have held that expungement is not what
Congress wanted to accomplishthrough section 5021. See United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th
Cir. 1977); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 452 F.
Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United
States v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234 (D.NJ. 1979).
29. Many courts have referred to the congressional purpose of permitting successful offenders
to live free of the "taint" of a conviction. See, eg., United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d 1279, 1280
(4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11, 13 (6th Cir. 1976); Mestre Morera v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 462 F.2d 1030, 1032 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Hall, 452 F.
Supp. 1008, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); People v. Garcia, 93 Misc. 2d 667, 670,402 N.Y.S.2d 164, 166-
67 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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tated.30 A once-convicted youth would be free to become a productive
member of society because he would be free of any stigma from his
criminal conviction. Such, at least, was the plan.3'
There remained the question of how best to effectuate these con-
clusions about the nature of young offenders and promote the rehabili-
tative purpose of the FYCA. The result was section 5021, which
provided that convictions could be "set aside." It was left to the courts
to determine what those words would mean.
B. Section 5021.
The fact of a criminal conviction may arise in a variety of situa-
tions, ranging from later criminal proceedings to inquiries on employ-
ment application forms.32 If by setting aside a young offender's
criminal conviction Congress meant to expunge33 all record of the con-
viction, then its subsequent use in any situation, civil or criminal,
would be improper. If, on the other hand, Congress merely wanted to
award the youth a certificate of rehabilitation to help him explain his
criminal conduct, then third parties could appropriately rely on the
conviction in making decisions about him. As might be expected when
the political process is involved and some controversy arises, 34 it ap-
pears from the legislative history that the provisions of section 5021 of
the Federal Youth Corrections Act constitute a compromise between
full expungement and a token statement of rehabilitation.
Proponents of section 5021 referred to its effect in a variety of
30. See Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1979):
The set-aside certificate could hardly be regarded as conceptually inconsistent with an
expungement; if anything, it reinforces the conclusion that a significant event having
wide-ranging consequences has occurred. The certificate has also been regarded as a
symbolic token of forgiveness, trust, and confidence, thus aiding in the rehabilitation
process.
See also United States v. Glasgow, 389 F. Supp. 217,224 (D.D.C 1975) ("The Court holds that the
setting aside of a conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) is a form of treatment under the
Youth Corrections Act"); 107 CONG. RIc. 8709 (1961) (testimony of Sen. Dodd) ("I think Section
5021 represents an important factor in the treatment of youthful offenders"); Note, Expungement
of Criminal Convictions in Kansas: A Necessary Rehabilitative Tool, 13 WASHBURN L.. 93 (1974).
31. Many commentators have concluded that this aspect of the FYCA has been so limited as
to rob it of practical effect. See, eg., Harnsberger, supra note 5, at 396-97; Ritz, supra note 5, at
758-59; Saperstein, supra note 5, at 4-6.
32. See text accompanying notes 71-177 infra for a discussion of these situations.
33. See note 8 supra for a definition of "expungement." For a useful discussion of what
"expungement" means in practice, see Schaefer, supra note 5. See also Baum, supra note 8, at
821-28; Booth, supra note 8, at 163-65; Gough, supra note 8, at 147; Comment, Expungement in
Ohio: Assimilation Into Society for the Former Cririnal, 8 AKRON L. Rv. 480, 490-97 (1975);
Comment, supra note 8, at 127; Note, supra note 8.
34. See note 27 supra.
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ways. Some stated that it "wip[es] out ... the conviction. ' 35 Others,
focusing on the effect of convictions on employment opportunities,
noted that the Act would "blot ... out [the] sentence," leaving young
offenders "without any stigma on their [lives]" 36 or "stain on their
records."37 A third reference was to "restoring" a young offender's
"civil rights" to him.38 From these statements, one commentator con-
cluded that "there can be little doubt that [the sponsors of the bill] re-
garded the proposed FYCA as a bill which mandated expunction of a
youth offender's criminal records. '39
It is reasonably clear, however, that Congress did not intend to
provide for full and total expungement of set-aside convictions. In
1942, in the original draft of the proposed legislation, the predecessor
of section 5021 stated as follows:
Upon the conditional discharge by the [Youth] Authority of a youth
offender before the expiration of six years from the date of his con-
viction, where an original sentence was not imposed on such youth
offender, and upon the unconditional discharge by the authority of a
youth offender, upon whom an original sentence was imposed, before
the expiration of the original sentence, the conviction shall be auto-
mat/caly set aside and heldfor naught, and the Authority shall issue
to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.4°
By 1946 Congress had removed the "held for naught" language and
replaced it with a provision that was less favorable to offenders than the
35. See Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609, supra note 15, at 70 (testimony of the Hon. Orie L.
Phillips (10th Cir.)); id 82 (testimony of James E. Palmer, President of the Federal Bar Associa-
tion); S( id 110 (letter of the Hon. John Paul (W.D. Va.), in which Judge Paul objected to the
provision that "wiped out" convictions).
36. Id 19 (testimony of the Hon. Bolitha J. Laws (D.D.C.)).
37. Id 45 (statement of Sen. Harley Kilgore); Sf id 45 (testimony of the Hon. John Parker
(4th Cir.)) (the bill would permit the whole board to "set aside [a young offender's] conviction so
that he will not have a criminal record staring him in the face").
38. Id 14 (testimony of the Hon. Bolitha J. Laws (D.D.C.)).
39. Harnsberger, supra note 5, at 408-09. Harnsberger relied on the dictionary definitions of
words like "wipe out" and concluded that the bill's sponsors wanted to "obliterate" or "destroy
completely" all record of a conviction. Id 407. Other commentators have asserted without expla-
nation or support that if Congress meant section 5021 to have any effect, it must have intended full
expungement, ia, a sealing of the records from any further access. See, eg., Saperstein, supra
note 5; Schaefer, supra note 6; Note, supra note 5. The first view is too literal a reading of impre-
cise legislative testimony and is belied by other parts of the legislative history. See text accompa-
nying notes 40-47 in~f-a. The second view fails to acknowledge the possibility that a remedy short
of full expungement might provide a young ogender with substantial benefits. This partial relief
appears to be what Congress intended. See text accompanying notes 59-66 infraz See also United
States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp. 1008, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("It cannot be argued that the Act serves
little purpose if a defendant's record is not expunged in addition to being set aside").
40. Committee on Punishment for Crime of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,
Proposed Draft of an Act Recommended to Provide a Correctional System for Adlt and Youth
Offenders § 13, at 19-20 (1942) (emphasis added). This report was submitted to the House of
Representatives in 1943. See Hearings on H. 2140, supra note 15, at 5-6.
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one eventually enacted. It stated: "In the event an offender is uncondi-
tionally discharged before six years from the date of his conviction, the
conviction is automatically set aside and the offender shall be issued a
certificate to this effect by the Authority, such certflcate having the same
effect as apardon.'141 When Congress passed the bill in 1950 it adopted
the "set aside" language standing alone.42
Thus, whatever ambiguities may exist in the legislative history, it is
clear that Congress considered passing a statute providing for full ex-
pungement-the 1942 version-but rejected the proposal. Testimony
by Judge Orie L. Phillips43 in hearings conducted in 1949 supports the
view that the 1950 version was not intended as a full expungement stat-
ute. Judge Phillips agreed that section 5021 would "wipe out" a con-
viction, but also thought that the fact of the conviction might be made
known to potential employers. 44 Because convictions that are ex-
punged are ordinarily inaccessible,45 Judge Phillips's comments make
sense only if the records of the convictions would not be expunged and
might in some way come into the hands of employers.46
41. REPORT OF THE JuDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRcurr JUDGES 18-19 (1946) (em-
phasis added). A presidential pardon reduces the effect of a criminal conviction in only a limited
fashion. See text accompanying notes 59-66 infra.
42. The "pardon" language remained a part of the legislation until 1949. See Hearings on S.
1114 and S. 2609, supra note 15, at 7, 70-71.
43. Judge Phillips, then Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, was chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Treatment of Youthful Offenders of the Committee on Punishment
of Crime, a committee of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (later renamed Judicial
Conference of the United States). See Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609, supra note 15, at 59.
44. Judge Phillips testified that
the act does provide for the wiping out of the conviction f the youth is dcharged....The purpose of that is to help him get a job and keep him from having to be turned down
by a prospective employer because of the fact that he has had a conviction. It does not
entirely remove the diffculty but he can say to the proslective employer, 'I have gone
through this thing. They think I am rehabilitated and they have given me this clearance.'
Id 70.
45. See Schaefer, supra note 5, at 107-08, in which the author correctly concludes that young
offenders who have had their convictions set aside pursuant to the FYCA may deny the fact of
their convictions to potential employers. The possibility of denial, however, does not solve the
problem of whether the records themselves should be physically erased. See Gough, supra note 8,
at 150-62, 168-74; Comment, supra note 8, at 124-30; cf Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp.
1045 (D. Mont. 1975) (a credit reporting agency may disclose a conviction that has been set aside
under the FYCA), aiftd, 537 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1976).
46. At least two commentators conclude that Judge Phillips's comments refer merely to the
community's knowledge of a young offender's prior conviction, which cannot be erased. S'ee
Harnsberger, supra note 5, at 407; Note, supra note 5, at 562 n.121. Although such an interpreta-
tion is plausible, pakticularly where offenders from small, close-knit communities are concerned,
Judge Phillips's testimony does not appear to be directed at isolated occurrences. Since most
offenders live in urban areas, it is unlikely that this problem of a potential employer personally
remembering an applicant's conviction will arise in the ordinary case. It seems more likely that
Judge Phillips was referring to the possibility that an employer may obtain access to a non-
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One other feature of the statutory language indicates that Congress
did not intend to provide for expungement. Congress chose not to use
the word "expungement," though it could easily have done so. Al-
though that term may not have been as universally understood in 1950
as it is today,47 Congress had before it in the 1942 draft the "held for
naught" language, in addition to the term "set aside," which would
have removed any questions about the provision's meaning. It is disin-
genuous to assume that "set aside" was intended as a contemporary
synonym for "expunge" when Congress rejected additional language
that would have had precisely that meaning.
In recent years, several courts have considered the meaning of sec-
tion 5021 uniformly concluding that the FYCA does not provide for
full expungement.48 Before the question was squarely raised, a few
courts suggested in dictum that expungement was available to youth
offenders.49 Other courts determined in a conclusory fashion that ex-
pungement was not available.50 Finally, in United States v. McMainsa5
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue in de-
tail.
In McMains a young offender whose conviction had been set aside
under the FYCA brought a civil action seeking expungement of his
records. In a lengthy opinion the court vacated the district court's grant
of relief, holding:
[T]he Act does not authorize expunction of the record of a conviction
which has been set aside pursuant to section 5021. First, the lan-
guage of section 5021 does not plainly provide for record expunction.
expunged record of the conviction. This view of Judge Phillips's testimony was adopted by the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976).
47. The term "expungement" apparently first began to achieve wide currency in connection
with state statutes regulating the use of juvenile convictions. Most of these statutes were passed
after 1960. See Gough, supra note 8, at 168 n.97. Black's Law Dictionary did not include a defini-
tion of "expungement" until the 1979 edition. See note 8 supra.
48. See Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and United States v. Henderson, 482
F. Supp. 234 (D.N.J. 1979), in which the courts issued mandates entitled "expungement" orders,
but in fact did not determine that full expungement was appropriate. See text accompanying
notes 55-58 infra.
49. See, ag., Brager v. United States, 527 F.2d 895, 897 n.1 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Mollett, 510 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir. 1975); Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
462 F.2d 1030, 1032 (lst Cir. 1972); Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
United States v. Fryer, 402 F. Supp. 831, 837 (N.D. Ohio 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1976).
50. See, ag, United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977), and Fite v. Retail Credit Co.,
386 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975), ajt'd, 537 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1976), in which the expungement
issue was directly raised. Cf United States v. Klusman, 607 F.2d 1331, 1334 (10th Cir. 1979)
(expungement is not available under the FYCA) (dictum); United States v. Cannifl, 521 F.2d 565,
569 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975) (the record of a set-aside conviction is "not kept sealed") (dictum), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976).
51. 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976).
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We are confident that had Congress intended to authorize expunc-
tion, it would have manifested that intent with far greater clarity. It
has done so on other occasions. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(2). Second,
the fact that section 5021 provides for the issuance of a certificate to
the offender upon the setting aside of his conviction militates against
a construction favoring expunction. Had Congress intended to pro-
vide for complete eradication of the offender's criminal record, such
a certificate would seem unnecessary. Third, it would be incongru-
ous to infer a statutory right to expunge a conviction when there is no
statutory right, in' most cases, to expunge the record of an arrest that
does not result in a prosecution.5 2
The court thus approved the practice of law-enforcement authorities of
retaining records of set-aside convictions with merely a notation on the
records that the defendant has been discharged.
Although the McMains decision has been bitterly attacked,5 3 with
some justification,54 its reasoning is essentially sound. But McMains
does fail to recognize that even if Congress did not enact section 5021
as a full expungement statute, it nevertheless intended to accord sub-
stantial benefits to young offenders who comply with its provisions. By
permitting law-enforcement authorities simply to note the words "set
aside" on the conviction records and to disseminate the records as
widely as before, the court withdrew from youth offenders most of the
benefits the FYCA's proponents wanted them to have.
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, Doe v. Webster,55 does not suffer from this failing. In
Doe, as in McMains, an offender whose conviction had been set aside
52. Id at 389. See also United States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United
States v. Heller, 435 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (closely tracking the McMains decision).
53. See, e.g., Ritz, supra note 5, at 758-59; Saperstein, supra note 5, at 6; Note, supra note 5,
at 547.
54. The McMains court attempted to bolster its position by relying on questionable argu-
ments. For example, it argued that if Congress had wanted to expunge convictions, there would
be no need to issue certificates of discharge. 540 F.2d at 389. This conclusion ignores the possibil-
ity that an offender might at some time need to prove that his conviction has been set aside to
someone (ag., a potential employer) who knows of the conviction but not of the subsequent dis-
charge.
Similarly, the court's reference to 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(2) (1970) as proof that Congress knew
the term "expungement," 540 F.2d at 389, overlooks the fact that section 844(b)(2) was enacted in
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, title H, Part D, § 404, 84 Stat. 852 (1970), twenty years after the enact-
ment of the FYCA; by 1970 expungement had become a universally employed term. See note 47
supra. Despite this faulty reasoning, however, the court's conclusion that Congress would have
been more precise had it intended to provide for expungement is sound. See text accompanying
notes 40-47 supra.
55. 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234
(D.NJ. 1979) (extending Doe's reasoning to arrest records relating to subsequently set-aside con-
victions), discussed in note 57 .]ra Doe is discussed extensively in Note, The Expunct/on of Crim-
inal Records Under the Federal Youth CorrectionsAct: A Novel Judiclal Interpretation, 26 WAYNE
L. Rnv. 1111 (1980).
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sought total expungement and physical destruction of his records. The
district court denied relief. The court of appeals, in a scholarly opin-
ion, examined the FYCA's legislative history, determined that Mc-
Mains had failed to preserve adequately the strong rehabilitative
purposes of the Act,56 and reversed the lower court decision. Recogniz-
ing that mere notation of the Words "set aside" on the records would be
of only limited assistance to offenders, the court ordered the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to collect all set-aside records in a central stor-
age facility and not to refer to them except in the course of a bona fide
criminal investigation or by special court order.57 The court also or-
dered the government to respond in the negative when asked if an of-
fender had a prior conviction.5 8
The legislative history and the McMains and Doe opinions there-
fore establish that section 5021 is not a full expungement statute and
does not foreclose completely the use of a set-aside conviction. On the
other hand, the legislative history also reveals that Congress did want
to give FYCA offenders substantial benefits. Congress specifically re-
jected the proposed legislation of 1946 that would have limited the ef-
fect of the setting-aside process to that of a presidential pardon.59 As
56. 606 F.2d at 1233-41.
57. Id at 1244. Unfortunately the court added confusion to the "set aside" issue by referring
to its order as one of"expungement." Seeid at 1243. In fact, it was nothing of the sort; the court
did not order the record of the convictions to be erased or sealed for all purposes, despite the
court's statement that the records were not to be used for "any other purpose," id at 1244.
The decision not to require the records in Doe to be sealed left the arrest records accessible;
questions can thus later arise about the disposition of the arrest. One district court has noted this
problem with the Doe ruling, see United States v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234, 241-43 (D.NJ.
1979), and solved it by requiring the offender's arrest records to be sealed, id at 242.43. Arguably,
the problem arises not from any oversight by the Doe court but from the language of section 5021,
which refers only to records of convictions. Perhaps this is what Judge Phillips had in mind at the
time of the FYCA's enactment when he anticipated that offenders with set-aside convictions might
nonetheless be forced to respond to questions about their criminal records. See text accompanying
notes 44-46 supra.
58. 606 F.2d at 1244. By explicitly ruling that it is appropriate to balance other interests
against an offender's interest in nondisclosure, id at 1245, the court preserved the possibility that
interests other than law enforcement might control in particular circumstances. The court did not
foreclose an expansive definition of those "law enforcement purposes"-a definition that would
permit use of the set-aside conviction in a wide variety of situations-but it suggested that exten-
sive use of set-aside convictions was inappropriate by stating that the records should not be used
"for any other purpose," id at 1244, without leave of the court.
59. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra. One commentator has suggested that Congress
rejected the pardon provision because it believed the provision interfered with the clemency power
of the executive branch, rather than because Congress wished a different form of relief for young
offenders. See Schaefer, supra note 6, at 32. Schaefer, however, cites no support for that conclu-
sion. Because a rephrasing of the provision could easily have avoided the problem, it appears
unlikely that Congress sought to accomplish the effect of a pardon by using the vaguer "set aside"
language. Courts interpreting the FYCA have been unanimous in concluding that section 5021
was intended to provide a greater measure of relief than a presidential pardon. See, e.g., Mestre
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ultimately enacted, the relief embodied in section 5021 differs from a
pardon in a critical respect: a pardon does not affect the fact of convic-
tion; it forgives a defendant while reaffirming his guilt. A person re-
ceiving a pardon must first accept it, thus acknowledging his
responsibility for the crime.60 Once the pardon is accepted, it operates
merely to prevent any further punishment or disabilities from accru-
ing61 and to relieve the offender of a limited number of disabilities to
which he may already have been subjected. 62 But the fact of the con-
viction and the disabilities arising from it remain. 63 In contrast, even if
a set-aside conviction is not sealed, it is at least limited in its effect.
Although guilt may persist, the conviction is not reaffirmed nor can it
be treated as continuing.6 Whether as a reward for rehabilitation or as
part of an ongoing rehabilitative system, 65 Congress clearly intended
the setting-aside process to confer benefits on a young offender beyond
those granted pardoned defendants.66
The parameters of how and when a set-aside conviction may be
Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462 F.2d 1030, 1032 (1st Cir. 1972); Tatum v.
United States, 310 F.2d 854, 856 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp. 1008,
1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Fryer, 402 F. Supp. 831, 834-37 (N.D. Ohio 1975), af.d,
545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1976).
60. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 91 (1915).
61. See Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877); Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47
N.E.2d 425 (1943).
62. For full discussions of the scope of presidential pardons, see Baum, supra note 8, at 817-
21 (comparing pardons to California "expungement"); Lavinsky, Executive Clemency: Study ofa
Decisional Problem Arising in the Terminal Stages of the Criminal Process, 42 Cmn.-KENT L. REv.
13 (1965) (distinguishing pardons from clemency); Weihofen, Pardox An Extraordinary Remedy,
12 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 112 (1939) (describing the purposes of pardons); Weihofen, The Effect of
a Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 177 (1939) (describing the effect of pardons). See also Project, The
Collateral Consequences ofa Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. Rev. 929, 1144-47 (1970) (discuss-
ing the effect of pardons on particular types of disabilities), and the sources cited in Doe v. Web-
iter, 606 F.2d 1226, 1239 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
For articles comparing the effect of pardons to the effect of setting aside a conviction under
section 5021 of the FYCA, see Schaefer, supra note 5, at 115-16; Schaefer, supra note 6, at 32;
Note, supra note 5, at 557-62.
63. See, eg., Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914) (a pardoned conviction may be a "prior
conviction" for purposes of sentencing under a recidivist statute); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S.
149 (1877) (pardon does not entitle one to the proceeds of property sold under Confiscation Act of
1862). See Gough, supra note 8, at 150, and cases cited therein.
64. See United States v. Fryer, 402 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ohio 1975), affd, 545 F.2d 11 (6th
Cir. 1976), in which the court rejected the Government's argument that a set-aside conviction
could provide a basis for conviction under a statute that includes as an element a prior felony
conviction. The court chastised the Government for arguing that section 5021 provided a remedy
in the nature of a presidential pardon. See also Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972); Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United
States v. Glasgow, 389 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1975).
65. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
66. See note 59 supra.
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used therefore are set. Even Doe v. Webster67 and United States y. Hen-
derson,68 the most liberal decisions limiting the effect of such a convic-
.tion, deem fk expungement to be inappropriate. These decisions
recognize that some interests, such as the need for law-enforcement
agencies to be able to investigate, may at times override the purposes of
the FYCA.69
On the other hand, Congress wanted to confer substantial benefits
on rehabilitated offenders.70 Under no circumstances should a set-
aside conviction be used to the detriment of an offender more exten-
sively than a pardoned conviction, and in most cases it should be used
less extensively. Within these parameters, however, Congress left it to
the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to authorize use of
the convictions-whether the convictions be centrally stored, as or-
dered in Doe, or left in the hands of law-enforcement agencies, as or-
dered in McMains. Courts must thus balance the purposes and
interests served by section 5021 and the FYCA generally as well as the
societal interests invoked to justify use of the offender's records. The
following sections of this article analyze this balancing process.
II. THE USE OF SET-ASIDE CONvIcTIONS
In the typical case, an offender trying to prevent the use of his
criminal records argues that no reference may be made to his convic-
tion because, having been set aside, it no longer exists, -and because
Congress has forgiven him for the acts underlying it. The other party
logically responds that "history cannot be rewritten; ' 71 whatever subse-
quent events may have occurred, the youth was convicted. Thus, the
argument goes, to the extent that the fact of conviction would be rele-
vant, it remains so despite the discharge order. This dispute arises in a
variety of circumstances. 72
67. 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
68. 482 F. Supp. 234 (D.NJ. 1979). See the discussion in note 57 supra.
69. See also United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976), and United States v.
Hall, 452 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), in which the courts specifically held that the govern-
ment's need for full record-keeping outweighed any interest of the young offender in expunge-
ment. The court in Doe apparently shared this view.
70. See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
71. See, ag., Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (D. Mont. 1975) ("The court
record, regardless of the form of the judgment, reflected a fact, ia, the admission of a theft"),
aI'd, 537 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1976).
72. An examination of each civil or social disability that an offender may suffer is beyond the
scope of this article. See Project, supra note 62, for a comprehensive listing of these disabilities.
See also Note, The Effect of State Statutes on the Civil Azghts of Convicts, 47 MINN. L. Rnv. 835
(1963); Note, Restoration ofthe Civil 'fghts of Convicted Criminals, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 378, 379-83.
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A. Recidivist Statutes.
Most jurisdictions have statutes providing for increased punish-
ment of persons convicted of second and subsequent crimes. 73 The
statutes, generally called "recidivist statutes," take one of three forms.
The first kind, known as "enhancement" statutes, either include a
"prior felony conviction" as an element of a new crime or provide for
sentences with higher maximum penalties upon proof by the prosecu-
tion of a prior conviction. "Repeat offender" statutes, a more limited
form of enhancement statute, provide for increased punishment (usu-
ally by multiplying the first offense punishment by a fixed factor, de-
pending upon the number of prior offenses) for a defendant who has
committed the same type of crime in the past. These statutes are usu-
ally directed at the "career criminal," who tends repeatedly to commit
crimes in one particular category. The third type of statute takes a
slightly different form. It includes as an element of the crime the de-
fendant's denial of a past conviction in connection with some otherwise
lawful act, such as the application for permission to carry a firearm.
This form of statute is designed to prevent an offender from avoiding
any civil disabilities that attach to his conviction, such as prohibition of
firearm possession, merely by denying the fact of the prior offense.74
Most courts considering the issue have agreed in principle that set-
aside convictions -should not provide a basis for enhanced punishment
under any of these statutes.7" That view is consistent with the statutory
language and the legislative history of the FYCA. All recidivist stat-
utes are predicated upon the existence of a prior conviction. Even if
Congress intended set-aside convictions to be given some effect76 (that
But by discussing several discrete circumstances in which set-aside convictions have surfaced, this
article provides an analysis that will be generally applicable to other similar situations.
73. For a compilation of state recidivist statutes, see Note, A Closer Look at Habitual Crimi-
nalStatutes: Brown v. Parratt and Martin v. Parratt, A Case Study of the Nebraska Law, 16 AM.
CRiM. L. Rav. 275, 275-76 n.2 (1978). For discussions of recidivist statutes generally, see Note,
The Constitutional Infirmities of Indiana s Habitual Offender Statute, 13 IND. L. Rv. 597 (1980);
Note, The Habitual Crim'nalAct- Quantity of Convictions Only?, 59 NEB. L. RIv. 507 (1980).
74. Some jurisdictions employ all three statutory forms in varying situations. In the District
of Columbia, for example, a person convicted of an armed felony who is subsequently convicted
of a violent crime is subject to a penalty of life imprisonment with a minimum of five years
incarceration. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3202 (1973). A person who commits any nontraffic criminal
offense for a second time is subject to one and one-half times the maximum term of imprisonment
for the original crime and, if he commits a third similar offense, is subject to trebled penalties. Id
§ 22-104. Felony offenders in the District of Columbia are also barred from possessing firearms.
Id § 22-3203.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d 1279, 1280 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Fryer, 545 F.2d 11, 13 (6th Cir. 1976); People v. Garcia, 93 Misc. 2d 667, 670, 402 N.Y.S.2d 164,
166-67 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
76. See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
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is, not just "held for naught"), a court would clearly be wrong to hold
that they should be treated no differently from standing convictions.
That, of course, is what would happen if a set-aside conviction were
invoked to trigger a recidivist statute. Furthermore, the sponsors of the
FYCA made clear throughout the legislative discussions of the bill that
the FYCA was intended to free an offender of the stigma and taint of
his conviction.77 Surely Congress would have considered a new convic-
tion or increased punishment based on prior crimes to be such a taint.
In United States v. Fryer,78 the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio confronted this issue. A defendant pleaded guilty to a
federal firearms charge predicated on his false denial of a prior convic-
tion. Subsequently, realizing that his prior conviction had been set
aside under the FYCA,79 he moved to vacate his plea. The court
phrased the issue as follows:
[T]he Government's argument has merit if the provisions of § 5021
are in the nature of a presidential pardon. A pardon is an excep-
tional and specific act of grace .... It "remits punishment and
removes some disabilities, but does not erase the legal event determi-
native of the offender's status qua offender, i.e., the conviction it-
self.....
[But] if the effect of § 5021 is to eliminate the youth's status as a
convicted felon and to restore him to the position he held before the
commission of the crime, then it seems clear that he would not fall
within the ambit of [18 U.S.C.] § 1202(a) since the prior conviction
and all its pendent liabilities have been removed.80
77. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra See also United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d
1279, 1280 (4th Cir. 1977); Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462 F.2d 1030,
1032 (Ist Cir. 1972); United States v. Glasgow, 389 F. Supp. 217, 224 (D.D.C. 1975).
78. 402 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ohio 1975), a.'d, 545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1976).
79. The trial court treated the facts of the case as described in the text. The case on appeal,
however, reveals that the situation was more complicated. Only after the defendant pleaded guilty
did his attorney learn that his prior sentence had been under the FYCA. The defendant's criminal
records did not reflect that fact. The attorney filed a motion in the District Court for the Eastern
District of California for modification of the records. That court not only made the necessary
corrections, but also ordered the defendant's discharge from probation to be retroactive to a time
before the termination of the defendant's sentence. By legal fiat, therefore, the offender's convic-
tion was automatically set aside "prior" to the new offense. See United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d
11, 13 (6th Cir. 1976).
80. 402 F. Supp. at 834 (citations omitted). The Government argued in Fryer that the statute
at issue, 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (1970), expressly provided that pardoned convictions could not
become the basis for recidivist treatment. The government argued that if the statute intended to
exempt set-aside convictions as well, it would have done so explicitly. The court rejected this
argument by determining that a conviction set aside and therefore "non-existent" cannot logically
be compared to a pardoned but continuing conviction. As discussed in the text accompanying
notes 59-66 supra, the court could easily have reached the same result by deciding that a set-aside
conviction must be more circumspectly used than a pardoned conviction.
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The court concluded that the legislative intent was to erase the effect of
the conviction, and ordered withdrawal of the plea and dismissal of the
charges.
The Government appealed the district court's order, claiming the
court had improperly treated section 5021 as an expungement statute.
In a brief opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected
the argument and affirmed the district court's order, finding that as the
defendant "did not have [a] prior felony conviction" and "was not in
fact a convicted felon," he had violated no law.81 Although not agree-
ing with the lower court's reading of the legislative history in all re-
spects,8 2 the court of appeals held that Congress did intend to relieve
FYCA offenders83 from treatment as recidivists.
At least one commentator has disapproved strongly of the reason-
ing of the two Fryer courts.84 The basis for the disapproval appears to
be that the setting aside of a conviction is predicated primarily on the
offender's rehabilitation; the offender's commission of a second crime
shows that he is not rehabilitated and therefore should forfeit the bene-
fits of the FYCA.8 5
Though this syllogism is credible, particularly in view of Con-
gress's realization in 1950 that at best only seventy percent of all FYCA
offenders would be rehabilitated,8 6 there is no support for it in the legis-
lative history. Congress was aware that FYCA offenders might prove
unworthy of a set-aside sentence after the termination of the sentence.
It could easily have provided for the set-aside determination to be
81. 545 F.2d 11, 13 (6th Cir. 1976).
82. See, e.g., id at 13-14.
83. See note 10 supra.
84. See Ritz, su.pra note 5, at 759:
It would be an extraordinary perversion of the original purposes of the YCA if the "no
Prior felony conviction" theory of these cases [Fryer and United States v. Purgason, 565
.2d 1279 (4th Cr. 1977)] should be extended to the recidivist, so that the two-time
offender, whose first conviction has been set aside, cannot be convicted as a second of-
fender.
See also Note, supra note 8, at 136 (arguing that the public interest in prohibiting potentially
dangerous persons from having access to firearms should outweigh even a policy of full expunge-
ment).
85. This reasoning, of course, does not apply when the recidivist statute, e.g., 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 1202(a) (1970), is one punishing failure to acknowledge a prior conviction. If a young offender
is to be relieved of the stigma associated with his conviction, as Congress intended, he must be
permitted to deny the conviction if asked about it. See Schaefer, supra note 6, at 33-34. Any other
practice would place him in the dilemma of choosing to be penalized for his conviction or to be
penalized for denying it. The courts in Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1239-41, 1244 (D.C. Cir.
1979), and United States v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234,244 (D.N.J. 1979), explicitly held that an
offender may deny the existence of a set-aside conviction. Such a denial, of course, in no way
shows the offender to be unrehabilitated or unworthy of the benefits of the FYCA.
86. H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 12, at 10, refprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONo. SERV.
3983, 3993.
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made at some time thereafter.8 7 Yet Congress chose not to do so, rely-
ing instead on the discretion of the judges and parole authorities to
determine which offenders are not worthy of relief.88 In making that
determination Congress considered the ongoing rehabilitative effect of
the discharge process itself,89 and apparently determined that this reha-
bilitative effect outweighs society's interest in using the conviction to
enhance punishment if the offender sins again. Thus, Congress did not
provide for subsequent use of the conviction-as it could easily have
done-but rather determined that in the proper circumstances a con-
viction should be wholly set aside. The Fryer courts correctly held,
then, that set-aside convictions should not provide the basis for en-
hanced punishment under recidivist statutes.90
87. Some state statutes provide for expungement upon application of the offender a specified
number of years after completion of the sentence. See, e.g., 41 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 780.621 (1968); 2C NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52-2 (West 1980).
88. Although some courts treat the issue of whether to set aside the conviction of a young
offender who has not violated the conditions of his probation or parole as a ministerial matter,
section 5021 by its terms affords the authorities discretion not to set a conviction aside. See note 7
supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
90. Situations may arise that make application of this rule difficult because of the relative
timing of the setting-aside of the conviction, the second crime, and the second conviction. The
courts have unanimously held that the "mere possibility" that a conviction will be set aside does
not suffice to prevent application of a recidivist statute. See, e.g., United States v. Vice, 562 F.2d
1004, 1005 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); State v. Pacheco, 121 Ariz. 88, 90-91,
588 P.2d 830, 832-33 (1978); People v. Loomis, 231 Cal. App. 2d 594, 596, 42 Cal. Rptr. 124, 126
(1965); Perrin v. State, 198 Kan. 650, 653, 426 P.2d 39, 42 (1967). Although this rule might not be
appropriate where other consequences of the FYCA are involved, see text accompanying notes
171-77 infra, it seems correct in the recidivist context. If the offender has committed a second
crime before the termination of his sentence under the FYCA, a sentencing judge or parole au-
thority would not likely find the offender sufficiently rehabilitated to merit section 5021 treatment.
A rule based on this general premise seems appropriate. If the recidivist statute is one that pun-
ishes the denial of a conviction, see text accompanying notes 73-74 supra, its application to an
offender denying a not yet set-aside conviction is also proper, for such an offender has not yet
shown himself to be rehabilitated and therefore different from any other offender. Thus the bene-
fits that the statute seeks to deny other offenders (ag., the right to possess firearms) are correctly
denied to him. See State v. Pacheco, 121 Ariz. 88, 90-91, 588 P.2d 830, 833 (1978). See also Perrin
v. State, 198 Kan. 650, 653, 426 P.2d 39, 42 (1967).
A more complex problem arises when the second crime occurs before the first conviction is set
aside, but the second conviction occurs after the setting aside. In this situation the authority su-
pervising the initial sentence has determined that, despite the pendency of a new charge, the of-
fender is rehabilitated and deserves to have his sentence set aside. If the recidivist statute in
question is one that punishes a second conviction, it should not be applied. At the time of the
"second" conviction, the first conviction no longer exists, so it is inappropriate to treat the defend-
ant as a second offender. See United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1976), which, upon
close reading, presents precisely this situation. See note 79 supra. In People v. Loomis, 231 Cal.
App. 2d 594, 42 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965), however, the court held without explanation that "appel-
lant's status at the time he possessed the gun is the critical issue." Id at 596, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
If the recidivist statute punishes a denial of the conviction, however, this reasoning does not
apply. When an offender has denied the fact of his conviction before it has been set aside, he
495
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B. Pretrial Diversion Programs.
The admission of an FYCA offender to a pretrial diversion pro-
gram raises almost the same issues as punishment under a recidivist
statute, but demands a different result. Pretrial diversion is
a formalized procedure authorized by legislation, court rule, or, most
commonly, by informal prosecutorial consent, whereby persons who
are accused of certain criminal offenses and meet preestablished cri-
teria have their prosecution suspended for a three month.., period
and are placed in a community-based rehabilitation program. The
rehabilitation program may include counseling, training, and job
placement. If conditions of the diversion referral are satisfied, the
prosecution may be nolle prossed or the case dismissed; if not, the
accused is returned for normal criminal processing. 91
The criteria for admission into diversion programs vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. Although guidelines are typically available, 92
seeks to obtain a benefit to which he is not entitled or to avoid a disability he deserves. Because
the element of the offense is the denial, not the conviction, invoking the recidivist statute would
neither be inequitible nor contrary to the legislative intent. See United States v. Vice, 562 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
One final sequence remains to be discussed: where the second crime and conviction have
taken place, the recidivist statute has been applied, and the prior FYCA convictiohi is subse-
quently set aside. The small likelihood of this situation arising, discussed above, explains the
absence of any applicable case. Although there are cases holding that a successful appeal of a
prior conviction will not negate the interim application of a recidivist statute, a similar result for
set-aside convictions is, in this author's view, inequitable. See, e.g., People v. Clapp, 67 Cal. App.
2d 197, 153 P.2d 758 (1944); People v. District Court, 191 Colo. 558, 554 P.2d 1105 (1976) (en
banc); People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, 209 N.W. 110 (1926). Contra, Neal v. Commonwealth,
221 Ky. 239,298 S.W. 704 (1927); Williams v. State, 125 Miss. 347, 87 So. 672 (1921); Staniforth v.
State, 24 Ohio App. 208, 156 N.E. 924 (1927); State v. Alexander, 10 Wash. App. 942, 521 P.2d 57
(1974). It is unfair to treat a person who ultimately stands convicted of only one crime as a
multiple offender. Although some logistical problems may arise, particularly when the second
sentence has already been completed at the time the conviction is set aside, the most reasonable
procedure would be to treat the defendant as a recidivist initially, see Perrin v. State, 198 Kan.
650, 654, 426 P.2d 39, 42 (1969), but to resentence him nuncpro tunc once the conviction is set
aside. As noted above, for statutes punishing the.denial of a conviction not yet set aside, the
subsequent setting aside of the conviction is irrelevant. Accordingly, in that situation the recidivist
statute is properly applied.
91. Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 827 (1974). See
generally E. LEMERT, INSTEAD OF CouRr. DrVEmION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (1971), McPike,
Criminal Diversion in the Federal Systenr A Congressional Examination, 42 FED. PROBATION 10
(Dec. 1978); Note, Pretral Diverson from the Criminal Process: Some Constitutional Considera-
lions, 50 IND. LJ. 783 (1975). See also the testimony and exhibits included in The Communlty
Sufpervision and Services Act: Hearings on S. 798 B5fore the Subcomm on National Penitentiaries of
the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 336-534 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings on S.798]. Since the establishment of the two pioneer diversion programs, Manhattan's
"Court Employment Project" and Washington, D.C.'s "Project Crossroads," approximately 50
jurisdictions have begun similar projects. See Nordheimer, Pretrial.Diversion Held Helpful in Cut-
ting Crime, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1973, at 46, col. 1.
92. See, ag., Internal U.S. Attorney's Office Memorandum on Pre-trial Diversion Guidelines
for Washington, D.C.'s "Project Crossroads" (on file at Duke University Law Library).
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the hallmark of the process is prosecutorial flexibility and discretion.93
Invariably, however, there are two limitations upon that discretion.94
First, diversion is ordinarily available only to offenders charged with
committing a specific category of crime or, if broadly available, is
designed to eliminate certain classes of offender.95 Second, only first
offenders or persons with a limited criminal record are eligible.96
If a diversion program admits only first offenders, 97 should an
FYCA offender who has had his conviction set aside be eligible? The
offender would argue that he is technically a first offender and there-
fore eligible. Those seeking to deny him admission would counter that
the new charge proves he is unrehabilitated and therefore unworthy of
a second chance.
Which view is better depends on the relevance of an unvacated
conviction to the diversion decision. A prior conviction bears nega-
tively on the defendant's request for admission to pretrial diversion in
four ways. First, the new offense apparently does not represent an iso-
lated mistake; the defendant cannot claim that he deserves just one
chance to prove his law-abiding nature, because he has already com-
93. See, e.g., Note, supra note 91, 83 YALE L.J. at 828 ("Diversion represents a discretionary
exercise and is often used synonymously with discretion").
A diversion program may take a variety of forms. It may be based on prosecutorial discre-
tion, see, eg., NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, PROJECT CROSSROADS AS
PRETRIAL INTERVENTION: A PROGRAM EVALUATION (1970); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PRE-
TRIAL INTERVENTION: THE MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1972),
administrative guidelines, or administered jointly by the prosecution and the courts as a form of
probation before judgment. See, e.g, 21 U.S.C. § 844(b) (1976); 27 MD. ANN. CODE § 641 (1955)
(subsequently amended in other respects at 27 MD. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS CODE ANN. § 641
(1980 Supp.). All schemes are designed to unburden the courts, give defendants an opportunity to
overcome what may be an isolated error in judgment, and provide rehabilitative services which
would be more costly if provided through incarceration. Note, PretrialDiversionfrom the Criminal
Process: Some Constitutional Considerations, 50 IND. L.J. 783, 784-85 (1975). While some pro-
grams require the defendant to undergo a prejudgment rehabilitation program, others acknowl-
edge that some defendants may have committed an isolated error in judgment and need no
rehabilitation. These extract a minimal measure of punishment to avoid letting the defendant off
scot-free and then provide for dismissal of the charges.
94. Note, supra note 91, 83 YALE L.J. at 832-44.
95. Some diversion programs, for example, are restricted to persons charged with drug crimes
or otherwise shown to have a connection with narcotics use. See Robertson, Pretrial Diversion of
Drug Offenders: .4 Statutory .4pproach, 52 B.U.L. REv. 335 (1972); Note, Addict Diversioir An
AlternativeApproachfor the Criminal System, 60 GEo. L.J. 667 (1972). Others, such as Washing-
ton, D.C.'s Project Crossroads, exclude persons charged with illegal firearm possession from their
purview. See Internal U.S. Attorney's Office Memorandum on Pre-trial Diversion Guidelines,
supra note 92, at 5.
96. See Note, supra note 91, 83 YALE LJ. at 832-33.
97. Project Crossroads, although somewhat flexible in the application of its guidelines, is one
example of such a program. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note
93.
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mitted a prior crime.98 Second, the defendant's failure to profit from
his first contact with the criminal justice system marks him as unre-
sponsive to rehabilitation and therefore less likely than others to benefit
from the diversion program. Third, the defendant has already demon-
strated that he tends to recidivism. He is thus the type of offender pros-
ecutors want to incarcerate, rather than assist. Finally, admitting him
to a diversion program will not affect his prior criminal record, and he
will therefore not be able to benefit from one of the principal goals of
diversion, the avoidance of a criminal record altogether.
Most of these negative inferences suggest that a set-aside FYCA
conviction, like any other conviction, should still render an offender
ineligible for pretrial diversion. The FYCA offender has already been
given his second chance through the FYCA; if he abused that second
chance by committing a new offense, nothing in the legislative history
of the FYCA or the case law suggests that he should be entitled to a
third. Similarly, like the adult second offender, he has demonstrated a
tendency to recidivism. The order setting aside his conviction does not
alter the fact that he has committed a crime in the past. Prosecutors
may justifiably fear that this defendant is not a good risk to avoid fu-
ture contact with the criminal justice system.99
98. Before a defendant will be considered for admission into a diversion program, he must
admit that he committed the offense charged. This requirement is based on the notion that it
would be unfair to impose sanctions on an innocent defendant or to treat him as one in need of
rehabilitative services. But because it often seems more unfair to deny benefits to one who reason-
ably claims his innocence while extending them to one who admits his guilt, prosecutors waive
this requirement fairly frequently. Waiver is especially common among prosecutors who view
diversion primarily as a means of unburdening the criminal justice system of an overwhelming
trial calendar and as a means of settling weak cases where the defendant does proclaim innocence.
See Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 292-97 (1972) ("When his evidence is
weak, the prosecutor will propose generous bargaining terms to overcome the defendant's inclina-
tion to go to trial").
99. An alternative method of analyzing the FYCA in this context is to consider the Act itself
as establishing a form of diversion program. Like such programs, the FYCA permits the young
offender to undergo a prescribed program of rehabilitation that leaves him with an arrest record,
see Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d
387 (8th Cir. 1976), but no record of conviction. An analogous "diversion program" for drug
offenders is authorized in 21 U.S.C. § 844(b) (1976). Under this program eligible offenders sus-
pected of narcotics use may plead guilty to the offense charged and postpone sentencing. If they
then refrain from drug use for three months, the courts permit withdrawal of the guilty plea and
the prosecutor dismisses the charges. Unsuccessful defendants are sentenced pursuant to their
pleas.
What is instructive about this analysis is that offenders who have previously participated in a
diversion program, even successfully, are generally ineligible for renewed admission. This prac-
tice is based on the same reasoning that applies to offenders with set-aside convictions; they had
one chance to make good, but lost it. Furthermore, this analysis demonstrates that a prosecutor
who considers a set-aside conviction without automatically denying diversion does not contravene
the legislative intent to eliminate a conviction's stigma. As with the denial of entry to a diversion
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Only with respect to rehabilitation does the setting aside of a con-
viction bear any relevance. Although a judge or a parole authority set-
ting aside a conviction has already determined that the offender should
be deemed rehabilitated, the FYCA contemplates that the rehabilita-
tive process may need to continue after the termination of a sen-
tence.100 The applicant for pretrial diversion can therefore reasonably
claim that he would benefit from further rehabilitation through the di-
version program.
On balance, however, a prosecutor would be acting well within his
discretion in relying on a set-aside conviction to deny admission to a
diversion program. The congressional desire to free the offender from
the taint of his prior conviction does not bar the prosecutor's considera-
tion of the conviction in this context.101 Because a set-aside conviction
differs from a normal one in that it puts upon the defendant some
stamp of rehabilitation, however, the prosecutor should not automati-
cally give it the full effect of an ordinary conviction. He should exer-
cise his discretion, taking into account the nature of the crime and the
defendant's record of conduct since the prior conviction. He should not
be bound by a rigid rule.102
C. Sentencing.
No court has considered whether judges may rely on a set-aside
program because of a prior diversion opportunity, a denial of entry because of a set-aside convic-
tion is actually based on the defendant's having received and wasted a "chance"; it is not based on
the prior offense itself. The prosecutor does not attach a stigma to the conviction nor treat the
defendant differently from other unusual conviction-free defendants (e.g., those having completed
A diversion program).
100. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
101. Diversion programs are ordinarily considered matters governed by unfettered
prosecutorial discretion. Even if a prosecutor could not lawfully consider a set-aside conviction, a
defendant would be hard pressed to find a procedure to challenge the prosecutor for having done
so. One commentator, however, argues that because diversion programs are a form of plea bar-
gaining and encroach significantly upon what would otherwise involve the court's sentencing dis-
cretion, judges should exercise their supervisory authority over the diversionary process. See
Note, supra note 91, 83 YALE L. at 839-40, 843-44. Bases for such judicial activity may be
imbedded in statutory language, see, ag., NJ.R. CRim. P. 3:28(a), (b); PA. R. CRIm. P. 175, 178, or
may be inherent in the court's supervisory power over the judicial system and the litigants before
it.
102. The analysis in this section applies as well to those diversion programs in which one prior
conviction does not eliminate a defendant from eligibility. All diversion guidelines include among
their criteria the number and types of convictions the applicant has had in the past. See NA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN AND YouTH, supra note 93, at 1; Note, supra note 91, 83
YALE U. at 828-29. In any system the set-aside conviction should be considered as a standing
conviction, except that the prosecutor should exercise particular flexibility with regard to it, giving
special consideration to the defendant's record of susceptibility to supervision and rehabilitation.
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conviction in imposing a sentence for a subsequent offense.10 3 While
judges are generally entitled to consider any fact in imposing a sen-
tence, o4 policy and practical considerations suggest the contrary
should be the rule where set-aside convictions are concerned.
Congress has provided by statute that a sentencing court must
have broad access to information concerning a defendant's prior his-
tory: "No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."' 05 Even prior to the en-
actment of this statute, the courts typically considered even the remot-
est of facts, including a judge's subjective belief that a defendant had
perjured himself, 0 6 uncharged criminal acts,107 charges that resulted in
103. The reason for this void of judicial authority is self-evident. Courts rarely explain the
sentences they impose, and thus no basis exists upon which to appeal an improper sentence. A
young offender therefore cannot establish that a judge has relied on the vacated conviction. Many
commentators have attacked the judicial practice of unsubstantiated sentencing precisely because
this practice results in unwarranted sentence disparities and sentences based on improper consid-
erations. See generally Berkowitz, YThe Constitutional Requirementfor a Written Statement of Rea.
sons and Facts in Support af the Sentencing Decisiorn A Due Process Proposal, 60 IoWA L. REV.
205 (1974); Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RUToERS L.
REv. 207 (1971); Korbakes, Criminal Sentencing Should the "Judge's Sound Discretion" Be Ex-
plained?, 59 JUDICATURE 184 (1975); Taparauskas, An Argumentfor Confrontation at Sentencing:
Binging the Offender into the Sentencing Process, 8 Cum. L. REV. 402 (1977).
In United States v. Klusman, 607 F.2d 1331 (10th Cir. 1979), the court considered a similar
issue. The defendant's conviction had been set aside. He was subsequently found guilty of a new
crime and appeared for sentencing before the same judge who had set aside his earlier conviction.
The judge remembered the defendant. The defendant appealed his sentence, claiming the sen-
tencing court had improperly considered his set-aside conviction. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence without deciding whether, in circumstances where a senten-
cing judge has no personal knowledge of a set-aside conviction, the judge may still take that
conviction into account. The court noted that "there exists a public interest factor which must be
considered. The trial judge has a broad discretion in designing the sentence. He should not be
required to erase from his memory a relevant fact about which he has personal knowledge." Id at
1334. By failing to order the trial judge's recusal, the appellate court implied that a set-aside
conviction may be considered by any sentencing judge.
104. See, ag., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949). For discussions of Grayson and the cases leading up to it, see Note, Defendant'r Right
to Protectionfrom Pdrior Uncounseled Convictions, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 196; 83 DICK. L. REv. 367
(1979); 28 EMORY LJ. 159 (1979); 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441 (1979); 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
407 (1979); see also Note,A Hidden Issue of Sentencing: Burdens ofProoffor DisputedAllegations
in Presentence Reports, 66 GEo. LJ. 1515 (1978).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976).
106. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52-55 (1978).
107. United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 118-21 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Crowe, 516
F.2d 824, 826 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 990-91 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 851 (1971); cf. United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972) (other indictments
pending), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973).
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dismissals or acquittals, 08 and convictions that were reversed on ap-
peal.1 0 9
The nature of FYCA convictions provides several potent reasons
why courts should be permitted to consider them in sentencing. First,
because they do represent convictions, they are far more reliable than
uncharged criminal acts or charges resulting in dismissals or acquit-
tals.110 If courts may consider those factors in evaluating a defendant's
character, they should arguably be allowed to consider vacated convic-
tions as well. Second, sentencing courts evaluate, among other things,
whether a defendant is susceptible to rehabilitation and what rehabili-
tative services he needs. It is certainly relevant to these determinations
to know what form of sentence the defendant has served in the past,
what form of rehabilitation programs he participated in, and what ef-
fect they have had upon him. Finally, the sentencing court must safe-
guard the community. If the defendant tends to recidivism, as the
commission of a second offense indicates, the court should be able to
take steps to prevent future victims from suffering injury."' Thus, in
fixing sentences, courts have usually considered even expunged juve-
nile convictions to which they have accidentally gained access.'12
There are, however, countervailing considerations. If Congress
truly intended to free a young offender from the consequences of his
conviction," 3 the conviction should not be considered in sentencing.
Treatment as a second offender in sentencing, like treatment under a
recidivist statute, is the quintessential stigma or effect of a prior convic-
tion. Furthermore, if a set-aside conviction may be used in sentencing,
the setting-aside becomes no different from a pardon: both prevent fu-
ture civil disabilities from accruing to the initial conviction, but no
more. Yet Congress without question intended an effect greater than
108. E.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949); United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d
309, 313-15 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
109. E.g., United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 1973).
110. There are some guidelines limiting the discretion of sentencing courts. See, eg., 12 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 407, 409-10 n.15 (1979). The most important of these limitations is that
the court may not rest its decision on unreliable or potentially unreliable information. In United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), for example, the Supreme Court remanded a case for resen-
tencing because the sentencing court relied on two convictions later found to be unconstitutional.
The touchstone of Tucker was the Court's determination that the convictions relied upon by the
sentencing court were prima facie unreliable. Set-aside convictions do not suffer from this disabil-
ity.
111. Similar reasoning is used in connection with diversion programs, see text accompanying
notes 91-102 supra, namely, that a defendant is entitled to one chance to avoid punishment, but
not to a second.
112. See, ag., Neely v. Quatsoe, 317 F. Supp. 40, 42 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
113. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
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that of a pardon.14 Finally, although the new offense may demon-
strate that a youth has "slipped back" on his road to rehabilitation, he
must have been thought to have made some progress toward rehabilita-
tion initially, or his conviction would not have been set aside. If a sen-
tencing judge is permitted to consider the set-aside conviction, he will
as a practical matter find it nearly impossible to distinguish the set-
aside conviction from a standing conviction. The earlier determination
under the FYCA of the defendant's rehabilitation will therefore lose all
effect, and he will be deprived of the reward Congress intended"t5 in
providing for the setting aside of the conviction. 16
It is not inconsistent to forbid judges to consider set-aside convic-
tions in sentencing but to permit such consideration by prosecutors ren-
dering diversion decisions."t 7 A FYCA offender denied diversion is
not receiving treatment harsher than a citizen who has not been con-
victed of a crime; he is merely being denied a form of discretionary
grace that would permit him to avoid the consequences of the first
crime he has committed. He has received his one opportunity at grace;
other offenders may receive theirs through diversion. If a set-aside con-
viction is used in sentencing, however, the FYCA offender is penalized.
He is treated as a second offender, while the ordinary first offender and
the first offender who has once completed diversion are treated as if
they have a clean record, even though diversion may have been far
simpler to complete than the FYCA probation or parole." 8  The
FYCA's "free" or "second" chance melts away under these circum-
stances. Enforcing a rule that leaves the FYCA offender in the same
114. See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
115. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
116. Some courts take the view that the congressional grant of a benefit is a conditional one
that the young offender forfeits if he commits another crime. In Smearman v. United States, 279
F. Supp. 134, 136 (W.D. Pa. 1968), the court used this rationale to justify imposing a six-year
sentence under the FYCA, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(G) (1976), where the maximum regular adult sen-
tence was five years. See also Brisco v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 818 (D. Del. 1965), afTd, 368
F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1966). Although this argument has some surface appeal, it lacks support in the
legislative history. Both the sponsors and the opponents of the bill agreed that the legislation was
for treatment and rehabilitation alone-not for punishment. See text accompanying notes 12-31
supra. Nothing in the Act suggests that its benefits could be forfeited by an offender's bad behav-
ior after completion of his sentence. Cf Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609, supra note 15, at 117
(letter of the Hon. Charles C. Wyche (W.D.S.C.)) (suggesting to the contrary, that "a boy who
makes one mistake should be permanently forgiven that mistake if his subsequent conduct indi-
cates that he has changed his behavior").
117. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
118. Because diversion programs are designed in part to relieve a court's calendar congestion,
those admitted to the program customarily undergo a short (e.g., three months) program of reha-
bilitation. Probation imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976), may last indefinitely and usually
lasts six months to two years in relatively minor cases. A sentence under section 5010(b) continues
for six years, and a sentence under section 5010(c) may be longer.
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position as a first offender for purposes of sentencing but not for pur-
poses of admission to a diversion program is therefore sensible.
In practice, courts can easily justify permitting or not permitting
consideration of set-aside convictions in sentencing. After the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Grayson119 that a court may
consider its belief that the defendant lied on the stand in fixing his sen-
tence, courts ignoring such convictions may be in the minority. Never-
theless, if Congress's enactment of section 5021 is to have any
meaning,1 20 the sounder approach would be to ignore the conviction.121
On balance, the risk of according a youth more favorable sentencing
consideration than he may deserve is a fair price to pay for effectuating
the purpose of the FYCA.122
D. Impeachment of Witnesses.
A FYCA offender may on occasion be called to testify in court,
either as a witness on his own behalf or as a witness for a third party.
One disability ordinarily attaching to a criminal conviction is that the
offender may be impeached with his conviction. 23 The law is unfortu-
nately unclear on the issue of whether such impeachment will be per-
mitted where a set-aside conviction is concerned.124
The confusion stems primarily from the imprecise language of
119. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
120. It is a common view that recent decisions interpreting the FYCA have rendered it a
charade. See, eg., Harnsberger, supra note 5, at 415-17; Ritz, supra note 5, at 777-79. Compare
the similar views concerning other systems limiting the effect of convictions found in Booth, supra
note 8, at 162-66.
121. This article recommends giving effect to a set-aside conviction for some purposes other
than sentencing, but only where the legislative purpose of the Act would not be disserved. See,
e.g., text accompanying notes 73-102 supra and notes 123-48 infra. The article at no time recom-
mends ignoring the setting aside of a conviction, as would occur in the sentencing situation, but
instead supports the use of the conviction only when the use would not flatly contravene the
purposes of the setting-aside provision.
122. Problems may occur if the sentencing judge learns of a set-aside conviction indepen-
dently of the sentencing process. See, e.g., United States v. Klusman, 607 F.2d 1331, 1333 (10th
Cir. 1979), discussed in note 103 supra. Recusal is a possibility here. Another is a requirement
that the judge give a short statement of reasons for the sentence he imposes, and that he explicitly
disavow on the record any consideration of the set-aside conviction.
123. The basis for impeachment with a prior conviction is the notion that the prior conduct
bears on the witness's readiness to perjure himself. See, eg., 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WiNsTE N's EvIDENCE 609 [02], at 609-55 to 62 ("Rationale for Allowing Impeachment by
Convictions; Alternative Solutions") (1978). There is always the danger, however, that the jury
will consider a defendant-witness's prior conviction not for purposes of evaluating credibility, but
instead as evidence of a criminal mentality. See the authorities cited at note 145 infra.
124. Thus far, this article has considered only situations in which a FYCA offender has com-
mitted a new crime and thereby disappointed Congress's expectation of rehabilitation. I. the
situations that follow, that is not the case, and a court must deem the offender fully rehabilit .ted
in deciding whether to allow mention or use of the set-aside conviction.
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Luck v. United States,125 the first case to address the issue. In Luck a
juvenile defendant was sentenced under the FYCA after the juvenile
courts waived jurisdiction of his case pursuant to statute. Two years
later he was charged with a new crime. At trial he took the stand on his
own behalf, and the court permitted the Government to impeach him
with his prior conviction. Luck appealed, claiming the trial court erred
in failing to exclude the prior conviction as a juvenile adjudication,
which by statute was not admissible. 126 The court of appeals rejected
this claim, holding:
We find no clear purpose on the part of Congress to withdraw from
the reach of this last mentioned [impeachment] statute convictions of
juveniles in the district court as adults following upon waivers of ju-
risdiction by the Juvenile Court. Just as more severe sentencing pro-
visions are available for those who are waived, so does conviction
entail the consequences that the government may seek to use it to
attack availability in a later proceeding.127
The court held, however, that trial courts should consider the witness's
status as a youth at the time of the conviction in determining whether
to permit impeachment by the conviction.1 28
The ambiguity of the Luck opinion arises from its omissions. No-
where in the opinion can one discern whether the defendant's earlier
conviction was ever set aside. The defendant never raised any specific
issue concerning the use of set-aside convictions, nor did the court
make clear whether it was confining its decision to defendants who
were eligible for juvenile court jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court at
no time drew any distinction between FYCA offenders as party or non-
party witnesses, a distinction that might well mandate different re-
sults.' 29
Some courts have treated Luck as a leading case;' 30 others have
sidestepped it (and subsequent cases relying upon it) and have reached
125. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See Ritz, supra note 5, at 759 n.81 ("The extent to which
FYCA convictions that have been set aside may be used for impeachment... has not been
resolved").
126. 348 F.2d at 766-67 & n.4; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2308(d) (1961 & Supp. V 1966) (later
superceded by D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2318 (1973)).
127. 348 F.2d at 766.
128. Id at 769.
129. The clearest discussion of the issue of impeachment with a set-aside conviction is found
in 3 J. WEINsTEIN & M. BEnaE, WEINSTEIN'S EVDENCE 609 [04], at 609-83 ("Effect of Par-
dons, Annulments, or Certificates of Rehabilitation") (1978). Even this treatment of the question
fails to consider whether party witnesses should be treated differently from nonparty witnesses.
130. See, e-g., United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059
(1976). The court of appeals in Canfr stated,
By way of contrast, a person subject to the federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.§§ 5005-26, is convicted of a crime and then is eligible for the alternative sentence pro-
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the opposite result without authority for their position.13 ' Only a few
courts have recognized that Luck fails to address squarely the question
whether a set-aside conviction can be used for impeachment. 132
Should a set-aside conviction be admissible to impeach a witness?
Consider first the nonparty witness. Weighing in favor of admissibility
is the point that if commission of a crime tends to show that a person
would perjure himself on the stand, the additional fact that the offender
was eighteen to twenty-six years of age at the time of the crime hardly
reverses that tendency. In addition, the rights of a litigant include the
privilege of introducing all probative evidence of bias or untruth on the
part of the opposing party's witness.
Yet a certificate of discharge is awarded to a FYCA offender only
upon a finding of rehabilitation. Unlike punishment under recidivist
statutes, admission to pretrial diversion programs, or sentencing, 133 im-
peachment would be of an offender who has committed no new crimes
to cast doubt on his rehabilitation. If his character is truly reformed, it
would be inappropriate to allow a jury to consider the conviction in
assessing his character and credibility.' 34
vided in that Act. . .. The record of this conviction is not kept sealed and it may be
used to attack credibility in a later proceeding.
521 F.2d at 569 n.2. Cf. United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 979 (5th Cir.) (failure to allow the
defendant to impeach a Government witness with a set-aside conviction is error, though harm-
less), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978).
131. See, eg., United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1005 (1978); State v. Pacheco, 121 Ariz. 88, 91, 588 P.2d 830, 833 (1978).
132. See, eg., Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 245 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Courts gener-
ally agree that a conviction not yet set aside may be used to attack credibility. That, of course, is
the minimum ruling of Luck itself. See also United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 465
(9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 978 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978). But the court may consider the possibility that a conviction will
be set aside in exercising its discretion to admit or exclude the conviction. Brown v. United States,
370 F.2d at 245 n.10.
133. See text accompanying notes 73-122 supra.
134. Compare the effect of a pardon. A pardon may be granted on the basis of subsequent
proof of innocence or rehabilitation, or for independent reasons, such as a particular act of brav-
ery. From these facts, the leading authority on pardons draws the following conclusions:
If the pardon was granted because the prisoner had political influence, or was a model
prisoner, or behaved bravely in a prison fire, the pardon should not affect his credibility
at all. The damage to his credibility. . . is not a [egal consequence of the conviction; the
conviction is merely evidence that he is untrustworthy, a fact not wiped out by the par-
don.
Weihofen, supra note 62, 88 U. PA. L. REv. at 182. He has also stated: "The only sound rule is
that pardon for innocence blots out not only punishment but also guilt; other pardons relieve from
further punishment and all other legal consequences of the conviction, but do not affect the fact of
guilt." Weihofen, supra note 62, 12 RocKY MTN. L. Rv. at 112. See also State v. Zinn, 562
S.W.2d 784 (Mo. App. 1978). Based on this analysis, FED. R. EviD. 609(c) provides that a
pardoned conviction, or a conviction followed by a certificate of rehabilitation, as authorized by
the FYCA, is admissible if the pardon or certificate does not stem from a finding of innocence or
rehabilitation, but is not admissible if such a finding has been made. Judge Weinstein concludes
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Other elements to consider include the possibility of stigmatizing
the witness and the effect of the admission on the litigation. A non-
party witness stands to lose little from the impeachment. 135 It may be
somewhat embarrassing for him to testify, but that problem is inherent
in all court appearances. To the extent the jury does not believe him, it
is the litigant offering his testimony who suffers; the witness will not
endure any effects of a "stigma" or "taint" resulting from the convic-
tion. Thus the courts should not give undue weight to the harm to a
nonparty witness in evaluating whether a set-aside conviction should
be used for impeachment. 136
The determination of the effect that the introduction of a nonparty
witness's set-aside conviction will have on the litigation is best suited to
a case-by-case analysis. The Luck approach of balancing the relevance
of the crime to credibility, the remoteness in time of the conviction, the
degree to which the witness's credibility is an issue,137 and the impor-
from this analogy of the setting aside of a conviction to a pardon that set-aside convictions are by
definition inadmissible in federal proceedings. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 609 [04], at 609-80.5 to 84 (1978) ("Effect of Pardons, Annulments, or Certificates of
Rehabilitation").
135. Professor Gough argues that an offender called as a witness and faced with the prospect
of being impeached with a prior set-aside conviction "would be strongly tempted to deny that he
has seen anything [and] would do whatever he could to avoid the witness stand and the possibility
of public exposure and humiliation." Gough, supra note 8, at 159. This problem arises with most
witnesses, regardless of whether they stand to be impeached by a prior conviction. Professor
Gough exaggerates the effect impeachment would have on a witness. Ordinarily, all that the im-
peaching party may do is ask a single question in a neutral form such as "Are you the same [John
Doe] who was convicted in [1965] of [armed robbery]?" While perhaps somewhat embarrassing,
this impeachment will not typically have a stigmatizing effect on a nonparty witness.
When impeachment by the prior conviction may prove unusually embarrassing-if, for ex-
ample, it is remote in time, the witness is a respected citizen, and the trial will be visible--the
stigma and taint of the conviction may resurface. Under these circumstances, a court would be
justified in closing the courtroom to the public, a process which the Supreme Court has recently
held to be constitutionally permissible in unusual circumstances. See Gannett Co. v. Pasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2830
(1980) (the presumption against closed trials can only be overcome in unusual circumstances and
for specified reasons).
136. One can argue that because the nonparty witness can be compelled to testify, he should
be given greater deference on the witness stand and should not be impeachable by his prior con-
viction. But because the very purpose of compulsory process is to enable litigants to introduce
relevant and probative evidence, the witness's preference not to give testimony or release informa-
tion about himself is not a valid ground for excluding the evidence.
137. If, for example, the witness is an expert witness, no perjury is likely to arise and the set-
aside conviction should not be considered. A contrary rule would, in fact, have a harmful effect
that the FYCA did not intend. For example, an expert who relies on being able to testify as part
of his profession (ag., an insurance adjuster) can ill afford to be impeached by a set-aside convic-
tion; few attorneys would risk engaging his testimony and services, for fear that the jury would
hold the conviction against him. This is a form of employment stigma that the setting-aside pro-
cess is designed to eliminate. See text accompanying notes 155-70 infra.
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tance of the witness's testimony is appropriate in this situation. 138 Ad-
ded to the balance, however, should be the conduct of the witness
between the time of his discharge from his conviction and the date of
his testimony; that conduct will be a fair indicator of whether the reha-
bilitation has so taken root that reliance on the prior conviction would
be untrustworthy. 139
As a theoretical matter, the case-by-case approach is the soundest;
it grants juries access to set-aside convictions when they have some pro-
bative value, but denies access when that value is outweighed by the
need to avoid subjecting FYCA offenders to undue stigma from the
convictions. But although a hard-and-fast rule excluding the convic-
tion is uncalled for, a court should not hesitate to exercise its discretion
to prevent impeachment if rehabilitation has stripped the set-aside con-
viction of probative value. 14° Furthermore, when the impeachment is
permitted, a court should instruct the jury that the conviction has been
set aside and should provide a brief explanation of that process.141
Different considerations apply when the witness is a party. The
disclosure of a party witness's prior conviction can dramatically affect
the outcome for that party, especially if he is a criminal defendant. Re-
138. For a discussion of these considerations, see United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826-28
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976). See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVI-
DENCE 609 [03], at 609-62 to 72 ("The Luck Discretionary Approach").
139. Since Luck was decided, the District of Columbia has amended the statute that, the Luck
court found, gave it discretion to admit or exclude convictions for impeachment purposes. The
new statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1973), makes it mandatory to admit most convictions less
than 10 years old. See Project, supra note 62, at 1038-45, for a compilation of various state im-
peachment statutes. A nondiscretionary statute should not apply to set-aside convictions, how-
ever, because those convictions are no longer "standing convictions," and because they reflect an
offender's rehabilitation and hence are less reliable indicators of a lack of credibility.
140. Although some courts take the view that impeachment with a set-aside conviction will
have little effect upon a jury one way or the other, see, e.g., United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975
(5th Cir.) (the failure to allow impeachment with a set-aside conviction is "harmless error"), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978); People v. Robinson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 555, 81 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1969) (the
admission of a set-aside conviction is "harmless error"), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 913 (1970), the
questionable probative value of a set-aside conviction renders it inappropriate for automatic and
unqualified submission to the jury.
141. The Model Penal Code states that all convictions, including set-aside convictions and
pardons based on rehabilitation, should be admissible to impeach, but that the opposing party
may rehabilitate the witness by introducing the certificate of rehabilitation or order setting aside
the conviction. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(3)(b)(e) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Many juris-
dictions permit a witness impeached by a prior conviction that has not been set aside to make a
brief statement in explanation or mitigation of the offense. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609 [03a], at 609-80.2 ("Rule 609(a) As Applied by the Courts") (1978);
Project, supra note 62, at 1043-45.
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gardless of the type of cautionary instruction the court employs, 142
there is a substantial risk that the jury will consider the conviction as
evidence of guilt or undeserving character, rather than merely as evi-
dence bearing on his credibility. 43 The threat of impeachment may
induce the party not to take the stand, even where it would be appro-
priate for him to do so.' 44To be sure, the same risks obtain whether a
party witness's conviction has been set aside or not. But the policy of
the FYCA adds additional weight to the already heavy criticism 145 of
impeachment by a prior standing conviction. To extend the practice to
set-aside convictions, which are of questionable relevance even on the
issue of credibility, 46 would magnify the dangers. At least one court
has adopted a fixed rule precluding the use of set-aside convictions to
impeach criminal defendants.1 47 This appears to be the better rule
where civil litigants are concerned as well.' 4s
142. See Note, The Limiting Instruction--Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REv. 264,
281-88 (1966).
143. See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966). The authors' em-
pirical study shows that, other things being equal, juries acquit defendants without a criminal
record in 65% of all cases, but acquit only 38% of all defendants with a record.
144. See, e.g., Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1021 (1965); Note, To Take the
Stand or Not to Take the Stand- The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215 (July 1968).
145. See, ag., Spector, Impeachment Through Past Conictions A Time for Reform, 18
DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (1968); Note, Impeaching theAccused By His Prior Crimes-A NewApproach to
an Old Problem, 19 HASTINGS L. REv. 919 (1968); Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the
Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidencefor the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of
the Defendant Witness, 37 U. CiN. L. REv. 168 (1968).
146. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
147. United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460,464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005
(1978). Contra, United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 569 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976).
California has adopted a rule that a conviction set aside pursuant to California law may not
be used to impeach a witness unless that witness is a criminal defendant. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 788(d) (West 1966). The prior law in California was to the contrary. See People v. Mackey, 58
Cal. App. 123, 208 P. 135 (1922); Note, Penal Rehabilitation Benefits Curtailed, 2 STAN. L. Rev.
221 (1949). A possible basis for the current statute is the view, not shared by most jurisdictions,
see 3A J. WIGMORn, EViDENCE § 987 (Chadbourn rev. Supp. 1980); C. MCCORMICK'S HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. E. Cleary ed. Supp. 1978), that a jury should be
permitted to consider a prior bad act as evidence of guilt, even though the witness has subse-
quently proved himself to be rehabilitated. This logic is precisely what courts interpreting the
FYCA have tried to foreclose in holding that the setting aside of a conviction is designed to free
the offender from the taint of the prior conviction. See note 29 supra.
148. A more difficult question arises when an offender becomes a criminal defendant before
the term of his first sentence has expired. The only court that has directly considered whether to
permit impeachment by the use of a prior conviction in this situation held that the mere possibility
the conviction would be set aside was not, by itself, enough to render the conviction inadmissible.
Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 245 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1 If such a conviction is ruled admissible, and the offender is in fact innocent of the second
offense, he is likely to suffer a double penalty. The chances of his second conviction will be in-
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E. Civil Disabilities.
Civil disabilities resulting from criminal convictions may stem
from a variety of sources.' 49 They may be statutory. Some states take
from convicted felons such privileges as voting, 150 holding public of-
fice, 151 testifying in court, 152 serving as jurors, 53 or acting as a legal
entity.1 54 Other disabilities attach when someone in the private sector
learns of a conviction and consequently refuses the offender a benefit
such as employment.' 55 Finally, administrative agencies may interpret
their statutory authority or establish their own rules so as to penalize
offenders, as in proceedings concerning deportation 56 or professional
licensing. 157
With respect to these types of disability, the FYCA's legislative
history shows that Congress was concerned first and foremost with
eliminating the stigma the conviction would impose upon the young
offender; it wanted to'give him a "second chance" to be treated as an
ordinary citizen- 58 -to wipe out the "blot on his record" that would
otherwise "cause him great harm when he applie[d] for a position in
creased, see notes 142-46 supra and accompanying text, and a second conviction in turn will prob-
ably be sufficient evidence of a lack of rehabilitation that his first conviction will not be set aside.
The heavy criticism by commentators of admitting even standing convictions, see notes 142-47
supra and accompanying text, and Congress's general policy of affording a young defendant a full
opportunity for rehabilitation argue for disallowing impeachment in this circumstance.
149. These consequences are identified and discussed in full in Project, supra note 62.
150. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-101(5) (1975); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 561.024(1)(2) (Vernon 1979); WASH. CONsT. art. 6, § 3.
151. E.g., Ky. CONST. § 150; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 114.01(1)(j) (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 561.021.3 (Vernon 1979).
152. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-162 (1975).
153. E.g., KY. STAT. REv. ANN. 29A.080(2)(E) (Bobbs-Merrill 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 561.026(3) (Vernon 1979).
154. See, ag., D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-351 (1973).
155. See, ag., the studies discussed in Gough, supra note 8, at 153-55.
156. E.g., Rehman v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976); Mestre
Morera v. Immigration & Naturalizaton Senv., 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972); Briscoe v. United
States, 391 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir.
1962).
157. Professor Gough refers to an unpublished survey that identifies 59 occupations requiring
a license from which an offender may be barred. Gough, supra note 8, at 156. These occupations
range from yacht selling to the practice of law. See, e.g., In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 361
So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1978); Appeal of Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1978).
158. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra. See also United States v. Glasgow, 389 F.
Supp. 217, 224 (D.D.C. 1975). The Supreme Court has held that the removal of civil disabilities is
the quidpro quo for the possibility that a young offender charged with a crime with a maximum
penalty of less than six years may nevertheless be sentenced to a six-year term of incarceration
under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b). See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 429 n.6 (1974). See
also Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542 (1978), and authorities cited therein. These two cases
are discussed at length in Ritz, supra note 5.
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later years."' 59 Nevertheless, the limited number of cases that have
been decided concerning the civil disabilities mentioned above 160 re-
veal not only isolated practical problems unanswered by the legislative
history, but more significantly demonstrate that courts facing the
problems are disinclined to give full effect to Congress's intent.
One of the first such cases was File v. Retail Credit Co. 161 Even
though Fite's conviction had been set aside, a local credit reporting
agency obtained the court records of the conviction and passed the in-
formation along to its customers. As a result, Fite lost one job and had
difficulty obtaining another. He sued to restrain the agency from dis-
seminating the information. The district court, in an opinion giving
little heed to the purposes of the FYCA, denied relief. Relying on the
incontrovertible but irrelevant conclusion that history cannot be rewrit-
ten, the court held that Fite's convicton "reflected a fact, i e., the admis-
sion of a theft. That fact could be of interest to a potential employer
without regard to the technical legal consequences of it."162
By ignoring the purpose of the FYCA, the court avoided the most
vexing issue before it: notwithstanding Congress's desire to minimize
the stigma of a conviction, particularly when the offender seeks em-
ployment, does a court have the authority to police the actions of pri-
vate parties who rely on truthful information lawfully in their
possession? The answer-had the court addressed the issue-should
have been no. Congress recognized that, even if a conviction is fully set
aside, employers may find out about the conviction and rely on it.163
For those circumstances, Congress provided no relief except the issu-
ance of a certificate of discharge, which the offender could use to ex-
plain the conviction and his subsequent rehabilitation.
That does not end what should have been the Fite court's inquiry.
A court can take steps to ensure that the congressional purpose is fully
effectuated. It can limit the access of private parties to the set-aside
conviction records, instruct law-enforcement authorities to respond
negatively to inquiries about them, 164 and make clear to the offender
159. Hearings on S..1114 and S. 2609, supra note 15, at 117 (letter of the Hon. Charles Wyche
(W.D.S.C.)). See also Note, supra note 5, at 559-62.
160. See, e.g., Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (deportation); Her-
nandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962) (deportation); In re Florida Bd. of
Bar Examiners, 361 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1978) (bar admission); Appeal of Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla.
1978) (bar admission). See generally text accompanying notes 173-77 infra.
161. 386 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975), afid, 537 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1976).
162. 386 F. Supp. at 1048.
163. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
164. The courts in Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and United States v.
Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234 (D.NJ. 1979), issued such orders. See text accompanying note 58
supra.
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that he may answer a prospective employer's inquiry of whether he has
ever been convicted of a crime by saying "No."' 65 Through these ap-
proaches, the File court could have afforded some relief, while preserv-
ing employers' rights to use information lawfully in their possession.
A similar problem has surfaced with state-imposed disabilities
such as the removal of the right to carry a firearm or to serve on a jury.
The question arises whether an offender should be required to ac-
knowledge a set-aside conviction when asked (for example, on a fire-
arm-registration requirement questionnaire or a jury panel) if he has
been convicted of a crime. The answer is clearly no: otherwise the
setting-aside process has no effect. The few courts addressing this issue
seem to have agreed. One court noted that
if this Court holds that a young adult whose conviction has been set
aside does not have the same rights to possess firearms as other citi-
zens, [its ruling] would, in effect, state that the youth has not been
rehabilitated, that he cannot be trusted and that he does not deserve
a second chance. 166
By implication, the court authorized the FYCA offender to deny his
conviction when applying for permission to carry a firearm 167 and in
other similar situations.
Courts have given a different answer to whether an applicant for
admission to a local bar association must disclose a set-aside convic-
tion. In Appeal of Estes168 and In re Florida Board of Bar Examin-
ers,169 two state supreme courts overruled the automatic exclusion of
FYCA offenders based solely on their set-aside convictions. Neverthe-
less, both courts permitted the bar examiners to consider "the commis-
sion of [the] crime by [the] applicant in the overall measurement of
character and fitness and weighing it in connection with other evidence
165. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text. See also Saperstein, supra note 5; Kutch-
er, Looking at the Law, 42 FED. PROBATION 60, 61 (Sept. 1978). Not only should the youth be
authorized to answer in this fashion, but he should also be made aware that he may do so. A
specific authorization to that effect in the certificate of discharge given to him would ensure his
awareness.
In Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court authorized a FYCA of-
fender to "reply in the negative to any and all questions concerning his former conviction" (foot-
note omitted). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(3)(f) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("An
order [vacating a conviction]... does not justify a defendant stating -that he has not been con-
victed of a crime, unless he also calls attention to the order").
166. United States v. Fryer, 402 F. Supp. 831, 837 (N.D. Ohio 1975), af'd, 545 F.2d 11 (6th
Cir. 1976).
167. A similar issue arises when an offender on a jury panel is asked to fill out a form listing
his convictions. In Schaefer, supra note 6, at 33-34, the author considers the federal Juror Qualifi-
cation Questionnaire designed to implement the Jury Selection Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5)
(1976), and concludes that FYCA offenders may legally deny any conviction.
168. 580 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1978).
169. 361 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1978).
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of character."1 70 These rulings are questionable. Once the proper au-
thority has determined that a FYCA offender is rehabilitated, bar ex-
aminers have no more reason to consider past convictions than do
sellers of firearms or employers. Exclusion from professional status is
precisely the type of stigma the 1950 Congress that enacted the FYCA
considered and disapproved.
Several administrative decisions have addressed the right of the
government to deport immigrants on the basis of set-aside convictions.
After some litigation of the issue,171 the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service determined that set-aside convictions could not serve as a
basis for deportation.1 72 That determination failed to resolve the prob-
lem for most offenders, because deportation proceedings ordinarily
commence shortly after a conviction, before the conviction can be set
aside. Practically speaking then, the issue is whether deportation may
be based on a conviction that has not yet been set aside, but that may
be in the future.
Two courts have considered the issue,173 both concluding that the
"possibility of future grace in no respect affects the present fact of
guilt" 1 74 and thus that a standing conviction, whether susceptible of
eventually being set aside or not, may be used as grounds for deporta-
tion. Neither court, however, analyzed the problem nor offered support
for its decision, and on close inspection the result appears to be wrong.
Because the early cases and the Immigration and Naturalizaton Service
recognized that set-aside convictions may not be considered in a depor-
tation proceeding, courts facing the issue must start from the premise
that Congress wanted to provide relief from deportation once an of-
fender proves himself rehabilitated. Yet that premise means nothing if
the offender is not given an opportunity to prove himself.
This conclusion is supported by the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit in Mestre Morera v. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service.175 Mestre Morera was sentenced under the FYCA and
a deportation decree was issued promptly. Mestre Morera appealed,
170. Id at 426.
171. See, e.g., Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462 F.2d 1030, 1032 (1st
Cir. 1972), in which the court stated, "We cannot imagine a more complete deprivation of a sec-
ond chance than deportation. We are unable to presume that Congress, without any reference to
such an intent, meant in section 5021 to provide for setting aside a conviction for some purposes
but not for others."
172. Rehman v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 544 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1976).
173. Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984, 987-88 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Hernandez-Valensuela v.
Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962).
174. Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d at 640.
175. 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972).
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forcing a stay of the deportation proceeding. By the time the case
reached the court of appeals, the conviction had been set aside. Ac-
cordingly, the court vacated the deportation decree.
The present state of the law encourages such litigation. By pursu-
ing appeals and engaging in other delaying tactics, an offender who can
afford to do so may postpone deportation long enough to have his con-
viction set aside. It is grossly unfair for a court to predicate a result-
deportation or no deportation--on a youth's ability to engage in dila-
tory litigation. When, as in deportation proceedings, it costs little to
postpone an administrative decision until the sentence is complete,1 76
the government should do so. 177 In this way, the congressional purpose
to eliminate all civil disabilities for the rehabilitated offender is best
effectuated.
III. CONCLUSION
A young offender's conviction, set aside under section 5021 of the
Federal Youth Corrections Act, may yet be called up for use in a vari-
ety of circumstances. Because the legislative history of the Act gives
clear guidance in only a few of these circumstances, courts faced with
interpreting the "setting aside" process have floundered and reached
inconsistent results.
For some circumstances Congress's intention is unambiguous. For
example, the imposition of civil disabilities on an offender is clearly
forbidden. Congress expressly intended that the setting aside of a con-
viction remove the stain on the offender's record and allow him the full
exercise of a citizen's civil rights. Denying a FYCA offender the right
to carry a firearm, to sit on a jury, or to become a member of the bar
are precisely the types of disabilities that a court should not permit.
176. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is required by statute to postpone deporta-
tion proceedings until an incarcerated offender is released. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(h) (1976). See IA C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 1A IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 5.16c at 5-192.3-5-194 (rev.
1981). Thus, when a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b)
or (c) (1976), the expense of incarceration is not saved by deportation. Accordingly, the only costs
of delaying deportation until a FYCA sentence is complete are the costs of probation or parole
supervision.
177. There are other situations in which the courts have refused to stay deportation based on
an illegal alien's anticipation of a reprieve from an outside source such as a private bill of Con-
gress or the granting of a special visa application. See, e.g., De Figueroa v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 501 F.2d 191, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1974); Armstrong v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 445 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowes v. District Director of the United States Immi-
gration & Naturalization Serv., 443 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel Fen v. Es-
perdy, 423 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1970); Siu Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.), cer.
dis&ssed, 396 U.S. 801 (1969). In contrast, the possibilitiy of grace by means of a set-aside con-
viction is not a "purely theoretical possibility," see Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984, 987-88
(D.C. Cir. 1968), but a frequent occurrence. See Harnsberger, supra note 5, at 396.
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Other uses of set-aside convictions similarly contravene Congress's
policy of giving young offenders a second chance. A sentencing judge,
for example, should not consider a prior set-aside conviction to be rele-
vant to an offender's sentence for a second offense. Nor should a
FYCA offender be prosecuted under a recidivist statute for a subsquent
offense. Clearly, to so ignore the setting aside of a conviction is to ig-
nore the Congressionally mandated distinction between set aside and
standing convictions.
Yet just as clearly Congress did not intend that the record of a
conviction be totally destroyed or forever sealed for all purposes. Some
discretionary uses of a set-aside conviction do not conflict with the con-
gressional intent. The impeachment of a nonparty witness at trial and
the selection of an offender for pretrial diversion are two examples of
permissible uses. Impeachment, although embarrassing, does not ordi-
narily deny the nonparty witness any civil rights or prejudice his future
prospects. Pretrial diversion programs are not appropriate even for
every first time offender; having already had one chance to avoid a
criminal record, a FYCA offender cannot complain when his set-aside
conviction is given some, though not conclusive, weight in the decision
about him.
This article has considered only a few contexts in which a set-aside
conviction may surface. They show that when one party seeks to em-
phasize the conviction and the young offender objects, the courts are
forced to weigh countervailing considerations. In the past, judges have
ruled either without thought178 or by overlooking the importance of the
benefits Congress conferred upon young offenders in 1950.179 The spe-
cific examples discussed above demonstrate that the sounder approach
would be to articulate a careful balance of the underlying legislative
purposes and strong societal interests that compete against them.
178. E.g., Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975) (a FYCA conviction
should be freely available to a credit agency's customers to use in denying employment), afl'd, 537
F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 361 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1978) (bar
examiners may consider an applicant's set-aside conviction to deny his admission to the bar);
Appeal of Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1978).
179. Eg., United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978);
Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962) (the possibility of a set-aside
order is of no importance to a deportation decision); Smearman v. United States, 279 F. Supp.
134, 136 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (a FYCA sentence may become punitive rather than rehabilitative in
purpose); People v. Robinson, I Cal. App. 3d 555, 81 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1969) (the improper use of a
set-aside conviction is harmless error).
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